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     This dissertation examines industrial development from regional perspectives. It is 
composed of three parts: spatial adaptation of the Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(MSV) Model, application of the model to North Korea’s Kaesong Industrial Complex, 
and an analysis of regional inequality of South Korea. 
     Chapter 1 uses a combination of methods from economic development and 
economic geography. Departing from the MSV Model that views the poverty trap and 
industrialization as two Nash equilibria, this paper suggests the possibility of partial 
industrialization as equilibrium. In the beginning of an agglomeration, participating 
firms in a certain area may observe external economies with a decreasing fixed cost 
and rising productivity. However, once the number of firms exceeds a certain 
threshold of agglomeration capacity, the region will experience various congestion 
problems that may block further development and it will get stuck in a state of partial 
industrialization. Nevertheles, by Critical Minimum Effort, an economy may get out of 
this partial industrialization and reach the status of full industrialization as long as it 
overcomes congestion problems, as has been true for Mexico City, and Upper Silesia 
in Poland, and Seoul in Korea. 
     Chapter 2 again uses the MSV Model to suggest a possibility for development in 
the Kaesong area of North Korea. More specifically, this paper deals with the effect of 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, where South Korean technology and North Korean 
labor are combined. Using the MSV Model, this paper predicts that if there is a 
sustained effort to maintain the momentum of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, then 
  
 
 
 
this will have large spillover effects in the entire region, resulting in a big push which 
breaks the poverty trap and leads to full industrialization. 
     These two chapters focus on the developments of certain regions in themselves. 
However, development of various regions can be viewed in comparative terms, in 
which case regional inequality becomes an important issue. Against this backdrop, 
Chapter 3 analyzes the pattern of inter-regional inequality by comparing the per capita 
GDPs of 15 South Korean provinces. Using Theil’s T Index, this research analyzes 
increasing or decreasing trend of regional inequality in South Korea, and then, 
decomposes the country into two different categories (Honam and non-Honam, 
Gangwon and non-Gangwon, urban and rural) and looks into the inequalities between 
the groups. Also, in investigating possible factors that may affect regional inequality, 
this research finds that trade openness, physical capital, and human capital are the 
three main factors involved and that a certain coordinated investment is needed to 
minimize regional inequality of the country, without compromising on development.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
POVERTY TRAP, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF “GETTING STUCK”: SPATIAL ADAPTATION 
OF THE MURPHY, SHLEIFER, AND VISHNY MODEL 
 
Abstract 
Based on spatial dimension to agglomeration, this paper investigates economic 
concentration and congestion. Departing from the original Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny model, where the two equilibria of the poverty trap and full industrialization 
are discussed, this paper suggests the possibility of partial industrialization. Unlike the 
original model in which fixed cost F and productivity α are assumed to be constant, 
the author argues that both F and α are non-monotonic functions of n (number of 
entering monopolist firms), and that an economy stays in a partial industrialization 
state when congestion effects and external diseconomies are dominant. However, 
situations are dynamic in that either Critical Minimum Effort or Critical Minimum 
Retreat could occur in the status of partial industrialization so that an economy might 
return to full industrialization or fall into the poverty trap.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
     The poverty trap has been a subject of great interest and investigation in 
development economics. Rosenstein-Rodan (RR) (1945) and Nurkse (1953) were 
pioneers in this area. They postulated that, in poor nations, a whole group of firms 
producing a variety of goods could become more prosperous by entering new markets 
together, yet each individual firm might make a loss by entering into production by 
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itself. As a consequence, in the absence of some kind of coordinated action, the 
economy remains mired in poverty. These economists argued that it is the 
aforementioned kind of trap that explains the persistence of poverty in less developed 
economies. Formalization of this idea into a model of multiple equilibria occurred 
much later: see Basu (1984), Murphy et al. (1989), and Paternostro (1997). 
     In particular, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (MSV) (1989) formalized a model that 
explained the concepts of poverty trap and industrialization as multiple equilibria, as 
well as big push as a policy initiative that enabled a nation to break out of the poverty 
trap and industrialize. The model’s multiplicity is frequently suspected in the real 
world. Many underdeveloped countries are in a stagnant poverty trap, which is a state 
of equilibrium. Furthermore, using Nurkse’s (1953) term, the trap becomes a “vicious 
circle” in which a less developed economy may go back to the trap after a small 
deviation from the equilibrium. On the other hand, industrialization is another side of 
equilibrium; most of the current industrialized nations were also industrialized half a 
century ago, and they have maintained the highest income levels in the world. This 
trend of two-state-equilibria is well captured in the MSV model.  
     Nevertheless, a weakness of this model is that it does not fully explain the 
incompleteness of big push. Accordingly, once the economy reaches a point of Critical 
Minimization Effort, the economy moves seamlessly all the way to the higher level 
equilibrium of full industrialization. In reality, though, not all countries have directly 
moved toward full industrialization away from the poverty trap; perhaps Japan is the 
only example that actually fits into the model. In many cases, escaping from the 
poverty trap does not necessarily guarantee full industrialization. South Korea and 
Taiwan, for example, successfully escaped from the poverty trap, but their economies 
have tended to stall half way there with a per capita GDP of around $20,000. There is 
no clear way to judge whether a country is fully developed or not. Considering that 
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GDP per capita of G7 countries are all over $30,000, however, it is difficult to say that 
South Korea and Taiwan have realized their full potential. Latin America’s cases are 
more obvious. Their economies seem to show stagnation between the poverty trap and 
industrialization; they are completely different from the poverty trap in Sub-Saharan 
countries, but also different from fully industrialized countries. All of these examples 
suggest the possibility of other equilibria with partial industrialization, or the 
phenomenon of getting stuck.        
     This paper investigates partial industrialization within the broad parameters of the 
MSV model. The basic structure will be maintained, but a modified version of the 
model will be offered. It is a second version modification in the sense that the 
modification of the first version was made by Murphy et al. to derive multiple 
equilibria by changing wage structures. This version is also derived from the 
multiplicity of equilibrium, but from a spatial perspective, which is based on 
agglomeration economies. Paternostro (1997) initiated this modification, assuming 
that the fixed cost of monopolist firms (F) is a monotonically decreasing function of 
the number of monopolists entering sectors (n). In the framework of agglomeration 
economies, he argued that the fixed cost incurred by a firm can be reduced as more 
and more firms participate in the production of goods. He achieved the same result as 
Murphy et al. (multiplicity of Nash equilibria in an economy), but with a simpler 
functional form.  
     This paper extends and generalizes Paternostro’s argument with further emphasis 
on issues of regional economics and economic geography. More specifically, this 
paper assumes that not only F (fixed cost) but also α  (labor productivity) is a function 
of n. Moreover, unlike Paternostro’s study, this paper argues that these functions are 
not monotonically decreasing in n.  
     One of the most important findings of this generalization is that it provides a 
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theoretical framework for explaining the possibility of partial industrialization and its 
dynamics. Unlike the modification made by Murphy et al. or Paternostro, this paper 
presents the idea that an economy may stay in the middle of partial industrialization 
instead of jumping into full development. However, situations are dynamic in that 
either Critical Minimum Effort or Critical Minimum Retreat could occur in the status 
of partial industrialization so that an economy might reach full industrialization or fall 
into the poverty trap.  
     This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the 
original MSV model from the general equilibrium perspective. Section 3 presents the 
so-called first modification of the model, developed by Murphy et al. It is discussed 
with a supporting example: an application of the results to North Korean industrial 
development. Section 4 explains the second modification, which revisits the 
multiplicity of equilibria in terms of spatial dimension. This section also discusses 
partial industrialization and its dynamics, along with confirming examples. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Description of the Model 
 
     The ideas of Nurkse and Rosenstein-Rodan were formalized in the MSV model, 
which demonstrates that an economy will be trapped in poverty when no sector has an 
incentive to industrialize, but every sector will be industrialized if they all earn 
positive profits (Basu 2000, p. 23). From the general equilibrium approach, this paper 
reinterprets the original model, assuming the same wage structure between 
monopolists and fringes.  
 
 
  
5 
 
2.1. Background 
 
The MSV model starts with the following assumptions.  
(A.1.) There are k sectors in a closed and less developed economy, and each sector 
produces a distinct commodity. 
(A.2.) There is a representative consumer (or, many consumers with identical 
preferences) with a utility function u(x) = x1x2x3…xk and income y.  
(A.3.) L units of labor are supplied by the consumer, and lj is the number of 
laborers employed in sector j for all j=1,2,….k,  where l1+l2+….+lk=L 
(A.4.) Each sector has one fringe firm and one (potential) monopolist firm. The 
number of sectors having a monopolist firm is n.  
(A.5.) Monopolist firms are defined as industrialized in that for a given input of 
labor, they produce more output than the fringe firms do. However, the quality of 
goods are the same regardless of whether they are from the monopolist or the 
fringe firms.  
(A.6.) Both monopolist and fringe firms have the same wage w across sectors. In a 
later analysis, w will be normalized to 1.  
(A.7.) Production functions of both types of firms are linear: in sector j, xj=f(lj)= lj 
(45 degree line and no sunk cost) for the fringe firm, and xj=g(lj)=α(lj-F)( α>1 
and F is a sunk cost) for the monopolist firm, where the function f depends on the 
technology of the fringe firm and g depends on the technology of the monopolist.  
(A.8.) While fringe firms freely enter and exit the economy in a competitive 
environment with zero economic profit, monopolist firms enter the market only 
when they gain positive economic profits.  
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2.2. Equilibrium 
 
Based on these assumptions, equilibrium can be derived as follows: 
 
1)  Consumers’ Utility Maximization Problem (UMP) 
                                                     max x1x2x3…xk                                (P) 
     s.t. p1x1+… + pkxk ≤  y 
  
  By solving for (P), we get    xj*demand  = 
jkp
y
 for j=1,…,k    
 
       2)   Producers’ Profit Maximization Problem (PMP)   
       π fringe = max (pjxj - wlj) = pj xj*supply –w lj*demand where xj=lj for j=1,…,k 
       πmonopolist = max (pjxj –wlj) = pj xj*supply –w lj*demand where xj = α(lj – F)   
 
      3)    A competitive equilibrium in this economy is (pj; xj, lj) for j=1,…,k such that  
i) xj*demand  solves UMP                 
ii) xj*supply  solves PMP 
   iii)    There are equilibrium prices pj* and w*(or λ*) in which commodity markets 
and labor markets clear.1
 
  
2.3. Fringe Firms and Monopolists 
 
     In a perfectly competitive market, fringe firms maximize their profit. The profit 
                                            
1 There is no description of how the labor market clears, but we have two markets and find explicitly 
that the goods market clears ({xj*}demand = {xj*}supply). Therefore, the Walras Law says that the labor 
market also clears. 
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function is:  π= pjxj - wlj = (pj - w)lj for j=1,…,k. If pj > w; when lj increases, profit 
increases as well. Therefore, demand for labor keeps increasing, and the market does 
not clear. If pj < w, the optimal demand for labor is 0, so there is no incentive to 
produce. The only significant case is when pj = w where the profit equals zero.2
     Monopolist firms are more complicated to analyze. Consider the demand side first. 
If pj>w, then, since the quality of goods from the monopolist or the fringe firms are 
assumed to be the same (A.5.), nobody will buy a good xj from a monopolist. As a 
result, the demand function that a monopolist faces is 
  
0jx = . If pj<w, people will only 
buy goods made by monopolist firms, and the demand curve3
( )j jx l Fα= −
 that they face is the 
same as the demand curve of the (representative) consumer in this country, which is 
xj= y/kpj. On the producer’s side, however, because , lj = x/α+F, making 
cost function c(x )= wx/ α +wF. Therefore, the profit maximization problem becomes: 
 
                                                    )( wF
wx
xpMax jjjx j
−−
α
                                (Q) 
 
Based on demand function, if pj>w, 0jx = , making a profit at jπ = –wF. If wp j ≤ ,  
j
j kp
yx = , or w
kx
yp
j
j ≤=  kw
yx j ≥ , (Q) is converted into: 
                                                    )( wF
k
ywxMax j
kw
yxj
−+−
≥ α
                                (Q’) 
Therefore, 
kw
yx j =*  and jπ = wFk
y
−− )11(
α
. Let 
α
11−=a . Then, the aggregate 
                                            
2 In a competitive environment, technology is assumed to be linear, which is homogeneous of degree 1. 
Therefore, it is natural to say that profit is zero. 
 
3 A geometrical explanation is foregone in this paper. A graph of this demand curve, along with a 
Marginal Revenue curve is provided by Basu (2000, p. 26). In this book, he processed his ideas by 
directly finding a profit maximizing point where MR=MC. This paper uses an indirect approach, 
starting from cost minimization, but reaching the same results.  
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profits of all monopolist firms entering each market are:   
 
                                                  π  = n* jπ = )( wFk
ayn −                                      (1)   
 
The aggregate income of this economy, denoted by y, is y = wL+π . Putting this 
result into (1), with w normalized to 1, we get 
nak
kFaLn
−
−
=
)(π . Therefore, the firm’s 
profit in sector j is, 
                                                 
nak
kFaL
j −
−
=π    for all j=1,2,…k                    (2) 
 
The total number of sectors in this economy is k, so it is always the case that k≥n. In 
addition, a<1 because α >1. So, in this case, the denominator is always positive; the 
sign of the profit of monopolist firms depends on aL-kF.  
 
2.4. Modification for Multiple Equilibria 
 
     Note that result (2) cannot have multiple equilibria. If  aL-kF>0, the profit is 
positive, and all monopolist firms will enter the market. If aL-kF<0, no sector will be 
industrialized. Hence barring a non-generic special case where aL-kF=0, there cannot 
be multiple equilibria. Understanding this, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny modified 
their model by changing (A.6.) into the following one. 
 
(A.6-1.) Work loads are heavier in monopolist firms, resulting in a higher 
wage than that of fringe firms. More specifically, fringe firms have the 
same wage w across sectors, while monopolist firms have wage λ across 
sectors, which is higher than w.  
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With (A. 6-1.), we solve the profit maximization problem using the same procedure 
that was discussed in 2.3. Now, let us normalize w and λ to 1 and 1+v, respectively. 
Then, the individual firm’s profit becomes Fv
v
k
y
j )1()
11( +−+−=
α
π . Let 
11 v b
α
+
− = , then Fv
k
by
j )1( +−=π  where b is assumed to be positive. According 
to (A.4.), the number of firms entering the economy is n, so the total profit of this 
economy is                                   
                                                   ])1([ Fv
k
byn +−=π                                  (3) 
 
According to (A.2.), y represents the income of a consumer in this economy where y is 
the sum of the firms’ profit and the workers’ wage income. More specifically,  
 
                    y = profit of fringe firms (0) + profit of monopolist firms (from (3)) 
                      + wage income of workers hired in fringe firms  
                      + wage income of workers hired in monopolist firms                      (4)   
 
First, consider the number of workers in fringe firms and their wage income. The 
equilibrium output xj* is y
kw
 (where wp j = ), and when wage is normalized to 1, it is 
y
k
, which is the same as lj*. Because monopolist firms enter n sectors, fringe firms 
occupy k-n sectors. Therefore, the total number of people working for the fringe firms 
and their wage income (when w is 1) is (k-n) y
k
. The rest of them work for the 
monopolist firms. From (A.3.), the total number of workers in this economy is L. 
Therefore, L- (k-n)
y
k
equals the number of laborers working in the monopolist firms. 
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Because each worker’s wage is 1+v, his or her wage income is (1+v) [L- (k-n) y
k
]. 
Plugging all of these into (4),      
 
                     y = [ (1 ) ]byn v F
k
− + + (k-n) y
k
+ (1+v) [L- (k-n)
y
k
] 
          
(1 )( )  
(1 ) ( )
v L nF ky
v k n v b
+ −
∴ =
+ − +
                                         (5) 
 
Plugging (5) into (3), and dividing it by n, the profit of the firm in sector j is,  
 
        
bnknkv
bvFnkvFnFLbv
j −+−
+++−−+
=
)(
)()1()()[1(π  for all j=1,2,…k      (6)            
     
Because k>n and b<1,the denominator is positive. Therefore, whether or not profit is 
positive or negative depends on the sign of b(L-nF)-F(1+v)k+Fn(v+b). Following 
Basu’s notation (2000), let ( ) ( - ) - (1 ) ( )n b L nF F v k Fn v bχ = + + + (p. 29). Then there 
exist b,L, F, v, and k such that χ(1)<0 and χ(k)>0, confirming the multiplicity of 
equilibria. A graphic explanation of this result is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n 
a 
b 
k 
jπ  
Figure 1.1. Multiple Equilibria 
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The two points at a and b can be viewed as Nash Equilibria. When other monopolists 
do not enter, the monopolist who enters the market alone gains a negative profit. This 
is true for every monopolistic firm in the country. Therefore, when no one enters the 
market, the Nash Equilibrium is not entering. However, when others enter, the 
monopolist can have a positive profit, so it has an incentive to enter the market, thus, 
another Nash equilibrium is made when everybody enters the market. Being stuck in 
the former equilibrium is a poverty trap; a small deviation from the equilibrium will 
cause the economy to go back to where it was. The latter equilibrium is synonymous 
with industrialization, and moving toward the latter from the former is possible by a 
big push, in which once monopolist firms enter more than a certain threshold of 
sectors, other sectors will be industrialized on their own, and the economy will jump 
into full industrialization. This idea is related with the so-called Critical Minimum 
Effort4
 
 in the sense that there is a minimum number of n such that once an economy 
has n industrialized sectors, the rest will industrialize on their own (Paternostro). 
3. Spatial Adaptation of the Model 
 
     Although result (6) nicely captures multiple equilibria of an economy, it may be too 
complicated to understand readily. By using simpler methods, this section modifies the 
MSV model to derive multiple equilibria. More specifically, the MSV model will be 
revisited from a spatial perspective, which has often been ignored in conventional 
mainstream neo-classical economics.  
     One reason for this negligence was that spatial economics, also known as economic 
geography, was often regarded as “intractable,” using the expression of Fujita et al. 
                                            
4 More explanation on the Critical Minimum Effort will be provided. 
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(2000). For example, agglomeration, and increasing returns to scale are very important 
to explain spatial concentration in economic activities. However, conventional cost 
minimization or profit maximization problems do not have general solutions to the 
increasing returns to scale. Therefore, as noted in Krugman (1997), spatial issues 
remain a “blind spot” in the economic profession.  
     Only since the late 1970s have economists been paying increasing attention to this 
field. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) developed a model of monopolistic competition, which 
contributed significantly to analyzing agglomeration and increasing returns to scale in 
a tractable manner. Shukla and Stark (1985) investigated socially optimal levels of 
migration in agglomeration economies, and Helpman and Krugman (1985) studied 
differentiated product markets and increasing returns to scale in international trade. 
Krugman (1991) named these recent theoretical and empirical developments the “new 
economic geography.”    
     The next sections combine development economics and economic geography. As 
Krugman (1998) argued, geography should play a role in development economics. 
Given that, this paper will revisit the MSV model from the perspectives of regional 
economics or economic geography.5
  
 Paternostro’s version has some relation to 
agglomeration, but I will generalize his ideas by assuming not only that both F and α 
are functions of n, but that these functions will not be monotonic functions of n as 
agglomeration proceeds. 
3.1. Concentration and Congestion: Measurement 
 
     Economies tend to get agglomerate. By forming a cluster, firms can share not only 
                                            
5 There are many names that represent this field of economics: regional science, economic geography, 
regional economics, spatial economics, and economics of agglomeration, to name a few. 
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transportation costs for input/output shipment, but also knowledge or information that 
is essential for production. Using terminology from Fujita et al. (2000), all of these 
positive externalities are “centripetal forces” that will benefit the industry, and 
according to O’Sullivan (2003), the economy will enjoy lower costs and higher 
productivity. Thus, in the MSV model, F will be a decreasing function of n, and α will 
be an increasing function of n. In addition to supply-side externality, agglomeration 
economies will be realized in the form of “thick-market externalities,” which will 
reduce asymmetric information for consumers and will give them better opportunities 
to compare the prices and quality of goods (Lall et al. (2004)). 
     Nevertheless, given that a physical space is limited, overconcentration can always 
be a problem, resulting in congestion and rent increases. The industry will experience 
external diseconomies where so-called “centrifugal forces” (Fujita et al. (2000)) will 
be dominant. Therefore, the MSV model will be modified such that F in the model 
will be an increasing function of n up to a certain threshold, and it will be a decreasing 
function of n thereafter; whereas α  will be an increasing function of n initially, but 
eventually, it will not increase any more after it exceeds a certain point.  
     What, then, is the threshold that distinguishes concentration from over-
concentration? How can the degree of concentration be measured? In Ellison and 
Glaeser’s 1997 study, they developed indices6
                                            
6 
 of geographic concentration using the 
so-called Dartboard Approach. They concluded that concentration does exist and the 
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extent of concentration varies within sectors.7
 
 On the other hand, Duranton and 
Overman (2002) proposed so-called K-density, and found, using UK industry data, 
that concentration takes place mostly on a small scale below 50 kilometers, and the 
degree of concentration is very skewed, and industries show broad sectoral patterns. 
Lall et al. (2004) suggested an alternate approach using industry employment in the 
district, and measured the localization economies within a sector. Data from the Indian 
manufacturing industry show negative coefficients for concentration economies from 
three industries, implying that benefits from external economies are offset by 
diseconomies of scale resulting from increasing wages and rents, as well as increasing 
transportation costs due to congestion.  
3.2. F(n) and α(n)8
 
 
     The literature on concentration measurement suggests that spatial agglomeration 
has a threshold from which it moves from sparse to overconcentration. Based on the 
MSV model, I argue in this section that there is a certain threshold of n separating 
concentration from overheated agglomeration. I further argue that F and α are the 
result of concentration and they tend to increase or decrease depending on whether or 
not the economy is overconcentrated, thus allowing for more externalities and also for 
non-monotonicities in the externalities. 
     First, F can be defined as: 
    
                                            
7 Using data from U.S. manufacturing industries, Ellison and Glaeser found that the tobacco, textile, and 
leather industries are relatively concentrated; and the paper, rubber and plastics, and fabricated metal 
products industries are loosely concentrated.  
 
8 In Appendix 1, a simple model is introduced to give a background explanation on this section. In this 
model, both F(n) and α(n) have step functions, but derives the same result.  
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                         F = travel time (T) + money spent on traveling (M)                       (7) 
 
T represents the time required to transport all the resources to a certain cluster; for 
example, a commute time for workers or the time required for input shipments. This 
does not contribute to improving the productivity, and it would be natural to assume 
that this is part of fixed costs. In order to quantify T, this paper uses the FHWA (or 
BPR) function.  
                                                  ])(1[0
b
C
xAtT +=                                                   (8) 
 
t0 = travel time without congestion (1hour) 
C = practical capacity of a certain length of road (65miles if it is the speed limit) 
(typically 80% of absolute capacity U (U=2000/hour in a highway)) 
A = parameter (often A=0.15), b = parameter (often b=4) 
x = the number of vehicles = the number of sectors = n9
 
 
Originated by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Bureau of Public 
Roads (BPR), this function is widely used10
     In order to apply this function to industrial agglomeration, suppose that each 
incoming sector (n) requires one vehicle to transport people to their workplace or ship 
a variety of inputs to the sector. With this assumption, x can be simply converted into n. 
When the number of sectors exceeds a certain threshold, the road to the industrial 
cluster exceeds its capacity. Eventually, congestion problems arise and the travel time 
 to measure the relationship between the 
number of vehicles and their travel time. The equation (8) reveals that once the 
number of vehicles exceeds the practical capacity of the road (1600 vehicles/hour if it 
is a highway), travel time increases exponentially. 
                                            
9 [The number of vehicles = the number of sectors] This assumes that one vechicle is required per each 
sector.  
 
10 In addition to this function, the Davidson Function and the Akcelik Function measure the same 
relationship. This paper chooses the FHWA (or BPA) Function because, unlike other ones, parameter 
values are easily accessible depending on the type of roads.  
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increases sharply.  
     M represents transportation costs. By sharing costs for input shipments, 
participating firms in a certain cluster may experience external economies of scale. 
This is one of the biggest benefits of being close to one another, and is a typical factor 
in explaining the concept of economic agglomeration (Krugman 1997, Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables 2000).   
     The transport cost function discussed in this paper resembles the idea of the iceberg 
transport function, which is often heavily emphasized in regional economics or 
economic geography. As its name indicates, the iceberg transport cost is the good itself 
that melts away. Originated by Samuelson (1952), this idea significantly contributed to 
international trade by treating distance and transportation costs in exactly the same 
way as tariff costs (McCann 2005). According to Samuelson, the iceberg 
transportation cost is a step-wise discontinuous function, meaning that staying within 
an individual country does not change the cost, but going into another country causes a 
sudden increase in cost, which is basically the same as tariffs. 
     Krugman (1991) developed Samuelson’s idea and introduced a continuous iceberg 
transport cost function, defined as: 
 
                                                      Dod eVV
τ−=                                                          (9) 
 
Vo: the value of the good at the origin location 
τ: the iceberg decay parameter 
D: the haulage distance 
Vd: the quantity of good actually delivered at the delivery location d.  
 
The equation (9) is the solution of the differential equation τ−=V
dD
dV , implying that 
the growth rate of the volume of an iceberg, which is a function of distance, is 
constant at τ− . Departing from this functional form, but using the same idea, this 
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paper derives a relationship between the volume of the iceberg and its transport cost. 
The reason for focusing on the volume is that it is related to the agglomeration and 
economies of scale. Suppose that an iceberg can be interpreted as raw material (or 
input) shipped to an industrial cluster or interpreted as output products shipped to a 
market. Then, as an economy becomes agglomerated, the size of an iceberg will 
become larger.  
     On the other hand, the transport cost is measured by its melting rate. If the melting 
rate is a decreasing function of the volume of an iceberg, the transportation cost will 
decline as an economy becomes agglomerated, and the economy experiences the 
economies of scale.  
     In order to verify this, let us assume that V is now the function of time (t) instead of 
distance. Assume further that there is a cubic iceberg with length a, which is also the 
function of t. a(t) has the original value a0, but continuously decreasing at a constant 
rate k as the iceberg melts away. That is,  
 
                                                           ktata −= 0)(                                               (10) 
  
Therefore, V(t)=[a(t)]3=(a0-kt)3 and kta
k
kta
ktakV
dt
dV
−
−
=
−
−−
=
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)(3
. Since 
3
1
0 Vkta =− , it is derived that: 
 
                                                     M =  3
1
3
−
−= kVV
dt
dV                                      (11) 
The left hand side of (11) is the melting rate of an iceberg, which represents the 
transport cost. If absolute values are given to both sides, (11) shows a decreasing 
function (at a diminishing rate, which is a convex function). 
Indeed, using the assumption presented in (10), it can be determined that as the size of 
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an iceberg becomes larger, its melting fraction relative to the whole declines. Applying 
this to regional economics, the horizontal axis can be interpreted as the amount of raw 
material or outputs proportional to the number of sectors (n), and the vertical axis, the 
transport cost (M). Then, as an economy is getting agglomerated and as many sectors 
in the economy share input or output shipments, the burden for the transportation cost 
that each sector needs to pay decreases. Eventually, the economy will achieve the 
economies of scale.   
     Summing up both T and M, represented at (9) and (11), the following figure reveals 
that F is a function of n. More specifically, it decreases in n up to a certain threshold 
and increases after the threshold is reached, describing the pattern of external 
diseconomies and external economies of scale, respectively. 
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Figure 1.2. F(n) (F = T+M) 
 
Note: The horizontal axis is the number of sectors (n). The graph for T is based on the 
parameter presented in the original function of (8) (t0 = 1hour, C = 1600, A=0.15,  
b=4). The graph for M is based on the functional form of (11) and, for convenient 
reason, assumes that k is 1.  
Next, define α as follows: 
 
F 
T
 
M
 n 
  
19 
 
                               α = knowledge spillover (K) + leisure time (L)                      (12) 
 
Along with the transport cost sharing, knowledge spillover is one of the factors that 
contributes to the external economies of scale and justifies the agglomeration trends. 
Bell and Albu (1999) argued that “knowledge systems” are core to the long run 
development of industrial clusters and that “intra-cluster” innovation and “extra-
cluster” openness to flows of outside knowledge are crucial for developing countries. 
Sandee (1995) showed how collaboration in a rural industrial cluster in Indonesia 
fostered the diffusion of innovation and the improvement of technologies. Johansson 
and Nilsson (1997) demonstrated that clustering in export processing zones in 
Malaysia encouraged local firms to learn from foreign firms how to globally produce, 
sell, and distribute their products. 
     However, the amount of innovative knowledge is limited, and the external benefits 
of the knowledge may fade away. Jaffe et al (2000) used the patent citation as an 
indicator for the knowledge spillover, and showed that it tends to have diminishing 
returns to the number of claims. Audretsch and Keilbach (2008) also said that, with 
some exceptions, diminishing returns to R&D are the “rule”. 
     Taking these studies into account, this paper uses a natural log of n as the 
functional form of K. Additionally, if T in (8) refers to commute time, leisure time is 
adversely related to it, so it can be assumed that L=-T for reasons of mathematical 
simplicity. Therefore, (12) can be explained as: 
 
                                                        TK −= )ln(α                                                 (13) 
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Figure 1.3. α(n) 
 
3.3. Profit and the Phenomenon of Getting Stuck 
 
     Overall, using similar reasoning to that of previous sections but with greater 
generality allowed in this section by adding spatial issues to the MSV model, a 
modified version of (2) can be derived. That is: 
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Since 
n
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C
nAtnF b ++= ])(1[)( 0  and }])(1[{)ln()( 0 n
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C
nAtKn b ++−=α , with 
their shapes displayed in Figure 1.2 and 1.3 respectively, the general version of the 
MSV model allows us to change Figure 1.1 into:   
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Figure 1.4. Modified Graph of Figure 1.1. 
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According to Figure 1.4, this economy still has two equilibria. Unlike the former 
analysis, however, the profit decreases after it reaches its maximum, after which the 
economy exhibits over-concentration and congestion. Two interesting results arise 
when it hits the n-axis. First, when there are b+1 firms entering the market, they will 
have a negative profit, giving them an incentive to leave the market. When b-1 firms 
enter the market, they will still enjoy a positive profit. Therefore, other firms will enter 
the market until there is no profit left. This story reveals that equilibrium is reached 
when the profit is zero. Even though we did not assume a competitive market, the 
economy ends up having a profit of zero. 
      More importantly, the results suggest the possibility of partial industrialization. 
Unlike the former results, not all of the monopolist firms enter the market at the 
equilibrium point b. This means that unlike the former case where industrialization 
gets off the ground when every firm participates in the market, this economy will get 
stuck in partial industrialization. 
     This partial industrialization occurs when external diseconomies, caused by 
congestion and over-concentration, outweigh external economies. When the 
agglomeration is made to accommodate a certain number of sectors in a cluster 
( Cn ≤ ), then, as was argued by Murphy et al. and Paternostro, profit will be an 
increasing function of n. However, if agglomeration exceeds a threshold point h, the 
economy exhibits an over-heating problem. In this case, as n increases, F will increase 
and α will decrease11
                                            
11 It is totally plausible that the economy can experience another case (e.g., both an F and α increase). 
However, an interesting case arises when F increases and α decreases from which partial 
industrialization can be easily derived. 
; accordingly, profit will decline. Equilibrium of partial 
industrialization occurs when profit reaches 0 before n reaches k.  
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It is also possible that an economy shows both partial and full industrialization 
sequentially. As displayed in Figure 1.5, even if an economy falls into a zero-profit 
partial equilibrium, it might recover if the external diseconomies of congestion 
disappear. For example, this upturn can occur by building more railways (See 
Appendix 1 for a model set-up), which can be generalized into an expanding spatially 
connective infrastructure12
 
. Then, the threshold that distinguishes agglomeration from 
overconcentration shifts to the right. At the same time, external economies will again 
dominate, resulting in a decrease in F and an increase in α as n increases. In this case, 
profit will start to increase again to reach full industrialization. As a result, the 
economy observes three multiple and stable equilibria a, b, and c that exhibit the 
poverty trap, partial industrialization, and full industrialization, respectively.  
 
                                            
12 Chapter 7 of the World Development Report (WDR) (2009) of the World Bank has relevant contents.  
Titled as “Concentration Without Congestion”, this chapter aims to identify and understand the 
interactions between geography, economic activities, and living standards, and to draw the implications 
of these interactions for public policy.  In particular, this chapter introduces examples of some regions 
that solved congestion problems and made successful urbanization and industrialization after the 
provision and efficient management of spatially connective infrastructure in the transport sector.   
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            b(partial                   
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Figure 1.5. Poverty, Partial Industrialization, and Full Industrialization 
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3.4. Critical Minimum Effort and Critical Minimum Retreat 
 
     Figure 1.5 explains Critical Minimum Effort and Critical Minimum Retreat. Based 
on this Figure, this section explains Critical Minimum Effort (CME). According to 
Leibenstein (1957), underdeveloped countries need a certain level of investment in 
order to escape from their vicious circle of poverty. In that light, Critical Minimum 
Effort can be interpreted as the smallest number of n, denoted by n2*, such that once 
more than n2* sectors are industrialized in an economy, the other sectors will 
industrialize their own so that the economy escapes getting stuck in partial 
industrialization. Since partial industrialization is mainly due to over-concentration 
and congestion in an economy, if these problems are solved, the economy will attract 
investments from industrialized firms, and eventually reach and exceed n2*.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Summary (CME and CMR) 
 
a 
a 
b 
*No major activity 
*Poverty trap 
*Initial agglomeration 
*Cogestion apprears later on 
*Diseconomies of scale become dominant 
*Successful agglomeration 
*Full industrialization 
*No congestion hassle 
*Critical Minimum Effort 
*Failed to solve congestion problems 
*From a stalled growth to the poverty trap 
*Critical Minimum Retreat 
*Solves congestion problems 
*Achieves full industrialization 
*Critical Minimum Effort 
*Another round of agglomeration 
*Congestions dominate again 
*Critical Minimum Retreat 
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     More importantly, Figure 1.6 also explains Critical Minimum Retreat (CMR) that 
will make the economy get out of partial industrialization and go in the opposite 
direction. In other words, there is the smallest number of n, denoted by n1*, such that 
once the number of remaining industrialized sectors is less than n1*, the rest of them 
will leave the economy to avoid a negative profit. When this happens, the economy 
will fall into the poverty trap with no industrialization. This scenario would occur if an 
economy is not able to solve its congestion problems and if external diseconomies of 
scale are too dominant in the economy for industrialized firms to maintain their 
businesses.    
     Figure 1.6 summarizes the discussion in Section 3.2 and 3.3. By introducing a new 
equilibrium point b, which is partial industrialization with the Critical Minimum Effort 
and the Critical Minimum Retreat, the situations are far more dynamic than having 
only the two equilibria a and c, as was argued in the original MSV model. 
 
4. Examples 
 
     This section provides five examples of partial industrialization and CME/CMR: 
Mexico, Poland, the Philippines, and South Korea.  
 
4.1. Mexico (b  CME) 
 
     As shown in Figure 1.7, Mexico suffered from an economic crisis in the 1980s. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, this country adopted an import-substituting 
industrialization policy, and most public investments in water, education, power, and 
transportation were mainly focused on Mexico City, fueled by government policies 
that offered a variety of direct and indirect subsidies to the region (Garza and 
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Schteingart 1978). 
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Figure 1.7. Mexico: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (Constant Prices, 2000) 
Source: Penn World Table 
 
As a result, Mexico experienced a huge amount of spatial concentration, Table 1.1 
reveals that a share of employment in the manufacturing industry in Mexico City 
soared to 42.1% in 1970 (Gordon et al. 1996).  
Table 1.1. Number of Manufacturing Employment in Mexico  
 1950 1970 1988 
Mexico City (A) 156,697 672,446 745,387 
National Total (B) 626,285 1,596,816 2,587,013 
(A)/(B)*100 25.0 42.1 28.8 
Sources: Derived from Garza et al., 1987, and Gordon et al., 1993 
 
Accelerated by the country’s industrial structure of import-substitution, the 
overconcentration contributed, in turn, to strengthening this structure. In the midst of 
this vicious circle, Mexico became vulnerable to an economic and debt crisis in the 
early 1980s.  
     In this direction, Kim (1990) pointed out that Mexico’s economic hardships in the 
1980s were due to overconcentration in a few “urban poles” such as Mexico City, 
Monterrey, and Guadalajara. According to his example, Mexico City alone had 44 
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percent of the total national industrial establishment with nearly 130,000 industrial 
facilities. Considering that the city suffered from severe congestion problems and that 
rural areas were deprived of opportunities for developing the non-agricultural sector, 
this geographical concentration widened urban-rural inequality, and became one of the 
main reasons that blocked the country from achieving full industrialization.  
     However, as Krugman (1998) argued, since the launch of export-oriented policies, 
together with the establishment of NAFTA, Mexico experienced a “dramatic 
decentralization” away from Mexico City in the early 1990s with the growth of a new 
export zone near ports and the U.S. border. Table 1.2 confirms this argument; a 
negative growth rate of employment in Mexico City has been recorded since 1980, but 
rings that surround its capital have been showing steady growth. This decentralization 
and spatial equality13
     In this light, it could be argued that Mexico has just departed from the point b due 
to the decentralization and export oriented policies, and the Critical Minimum Effort 
could be seen in this country to achieve a full industrialization.   
 may explain the “healthy growth” later on, in which the 
country’s growth rate was 5.4 percent per year from 1996-2000 (Lustig (2001)). 
Table 1.2. Average Annual Growth Rates (%) in Mexican Industrial 
Employment by 1960-1988 
 
Sources: Derived from Garza et al(1987) 
                                            
13 Basu (2006) stated that inequality within a country increases with globalization. The inequality he 
mentions deals with income level across people in the country. However, if we focus on regional 
perspectives, with globalization, a country is expected to be regionally equal due to decentralization 
(Krugman (1998)). Relationship between income inequality and spatial unevenness can be a further 
research topic.  
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-88 1980-85 1985-88 
Mexico City Total 16.7 15.1 -11.6 -7.0 -4.8 
Central City 5.4 2.5 -14.4 -8.4 -6.0 
First Ring 26.6 16.0 -8.2 -5.0 -3.2 
Second Ring 26.5 30.6 -17.2 -9.9 -7.5 
Third Ring 3.6 27.7 10.8 4.1 4.0 
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Note: Mexico City Ring definitions: 
Central City DF: Benito Juárez, Cuauhtémoc, Miguel Hidalgo, Venustiano Carranza. 
First Ring: DF: Azcapotzalco, Coyoacán, Cuajimalpa, Gustavo A. Madero, Iztacalco, 
Iztapalapa, Alvaro Obregón. State of Mexico: Naucalpán, Netzahualcóyotl 
Second Ring: DF: Magdalena Contreras, Tláhuac, Tlalpán, Xochimilco. State of 
Mexico: Atizapán de Zaragoza, Chimalhuacán, Coacalco, Cuautitlán Izcalli, Ecatepec, 
Huixquilucán, La Paz, Tlalnepantla de Baz, Tultitlán. 
Third Ring: DF: Milpa Alta. State of Mexico: Chalco, Chiautla, Chicoloapán, 
Chiconcuac, Cuautitlán, Ixtapaluca, Melchor Ocampo, Nicolás Romero, Tecamac, 
Tultepec. 
 
4.2. Poland (b  ?) 
 
     Gorzelak (1986) indicates that the economic crisis in Poland in 1979-1982, in 
which national income declined by 25%, was as severe as the Great Depression 50 
years earlier (Figure 1.8), largely due to overconcentration of production in some areas.  
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Figure 1.8. Poland: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (Constant Prices, 2000) 
Source: Penn World Table 
 
He defined spatial concentration of productive activities as “a high spatial density of 
producing units in a given area,” and argued that the economic breakdown in Poland 
resulted not from the consumption side but from the production side, particularly from 
an over-agglomerated industry structure. According to his research, the over-
concentration problem is especially serious in the Upper Silesia region where, in 1982, 
23.6% of the country’s total industrial assets had been located on 2.1% of the nation’s 
total area. This excessive industrial concentration resulted in overloading of the 
technical infrastructure system, including transportation, water and energy supplies, 
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sewage, and environment protection facilities, all of which led to a national decline in 
economic efficiency.  
 
4.3. The Philippines (c  CMR  b  ?) 
 
     After World War II, the Philippines was a fast growing economy and one of the 
richest countries in Asia, following Japan. In the 1960s, it looked as if it would 
become one of the Asia's superpowers. 
     However, during the regime of Ferdinand Marcos, economic growth and 
productivity declined dramatically as the economy was destabilized by corruption. 
Additionally, a severe recession in 1984-85 saw the economy shrink by more than 
10% (See Figure 1.9.) 
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Figure 1.9. The Philippines: Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita (Constant 
Prices, 2000) 
Source: Penn World Table 
 
From spatial perspectives, this economic downturn may have been due to congestion 
problems associated with over-concentration on a few urban areas. Markabenta (2002) 
revealed that industries in the Philippines were predominantly located in Manila 
region, which created a severe congestion problem. However, no effective 
decentralization policies or infrastructure provision had been active. Balisacan and 
Hill (2007) indicate the following three problems.   
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     First, the country is under-investing in infrastructure. The immediate cause of this 
underinvestment is the chronic fiscal constraint since capital works are the first to be cut 
when the budget must be pruned. A tendency follows to rely on donor agencies, in the 
process resulting in an investment strategy that is short-term in orientation and is poorly 
integrated. Donor reliance also compounds the politically-driven bias to favor new 
projects over maintenance. 
     Second, the overall regulatory framework lacks cohesion, coordination between 
national agencies and between the various tiers of government, and a clear division of 
responsibilities. About 30 national agencies are involved in infrastructure decision-
making, yet in some respects it appears that “nobody is in charge.” Hence, toll roads are 
not necessarily consistent with national priorities, and half-built bridges are a frequent 
sight in the countryside, particularly in the aftermath of elections.  
     Third, national level decision-makers appear unable or unwilling to deliver the long-
term policy predictability and guarantees that major private (and especially foreign) 
providers require. The politicization of large infrastructure investments appears to be 
unusually severe in the Philippines (Balisacan and Hill 2007).  
 
Going back to the MSV model, the Philippines in the 1960s may have reached, or 
almost reached, the status of full industrialization. However, congestion problems and 
ineffective infrastructures associated with poor leadership resulted in a Ctitical 
Minimum Retreat (CMR), by which the country ended up falling into the position of 
partial industrialization (point b in Figure 1.5 or 1.6). This position is very important 
for the future of the Philippines to determine whether a Critical Minimum Effort 
(CME) might bring the country back to the old prosperous status, or another CMR 
may cause the country to fall into the poverty trap.  
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4.4. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) (a  b  CME) 
     For the past 50 years, Korea14
Table 1.3. Urbanization Rates of East Asian Countries  
 has experienced a rapid economic growth of per 
capita GDP from $300 in 1960 to approximately $20,000 in 2007 (constant prices, 
Penn World Table). Along with this growth, Korea became dramatically industrialized, 
which facilitated urbanization. According to Table 1.3, the urbanization rate in South 
Korea has doubled from 40.7% in 1970 to 80.8% in 2005, higher than any of its 
neighbors. 
 
 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 
South Korea 40.7 56.7 73.8 78.2 79.6 80.8 
North Korea 54.2 56.9 58.4 59.1 60.2 61.6 
China 17.4 19.6 27.4 31.4 35.8 40.4 
Japan 53.2 59.6 63.1 64.6 65.2 65.8 
 
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). National Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Korea 
 
Urbanization: (Measured by Proportion of Urban Population) 
Most investments were concentrated in the Seoul area in major industrial complexes. 
As shown in Table 1.4, Seoul’s GDP is approximately 25% of the Korea’s total GDP, 
and if expanded to the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA15
 
), the share increases to 
almost 50%.  
 
                                            
14 For convenience, Korea refers to the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (North Korea) is excluded in this research.  
 
15 The SMA includes Seoul and its vicinities of Incheon City and Gyeonggi Province. 
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Table 1.4. GDP : The Whole Country, Seoul, and the SMA (Billion Korean Won) 
 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total 87,976 (200,387) 
194,546 
(332,274) 
410,131 
(485,494) 
577,971 
(577,971) 
817,812 
(730,121) 
Seoul 21,944 (52,411) 
49,312 
(88,926) 
102,171 
(127,111) 
138,492 
(138,492) 
185,091 
(158,304) 
SMA 38,092 (91,715) 
91,311 
(158,958) 
195,805 
(238,114) 
276,516 
(276,516) 
386,990 
(350,218) 
 
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). National Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Korea 
Note: 1 Million Won = $971 (May 30, 2008). The numbers not in parentheses are 
current prices, and those within parentheses are constant prices for 2000. 
 
As industry became more concentrated, the population of Seoul skyrocketed from 2.4 
million in 1960 to 10 million in 2005. As a result, the city faced severe congestion 
problems, especially from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. For example, the number 
of registered vehicles has increased sharply since the late 1970s, reaching 500,000 in 
1987, 1 million in 1990, 2 million in 1995, and 2.5 million in 2000, most of which are 
private automobiles (1.8 million in 2000, 74% of the total). On the other hand, road 
construction in the city has slowed down since 1970 to somewhere around 7,000km16
 
 
in 2000 (Seoul Development Institute 2008). As a result, the number of vehicles per 
one kilometer of roadways has exponentially increased. The growth rate was 
particularly high from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Figure 1.10), and the average 
vehicle speed in downtown Seoul decreased from 25.0km/hour in 1984 to 
16.4km/hour in 1990 (Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency) 
                                            
16 According to the Seoul Development Institute (SDI), the road length in Seoul is 7,888km in 2000. 
 
  
32 
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Figure 1.10. The Number of Vehicles and Growth Rate in Korea 
Source: Seoul Statistics Yearbook, and Korea Statistical Information Services (KOSIS) 
 
Another problem facing Korea up until the 1990s, especially in the SMA, was housing 
shortage, coupled with soaring land prices. The housing supply rate was stuck around 
50% until 1990. This shortage was due to the population growth, coupled with many 
intervention policies, including urban growth boundaries (UGB)17 and building-height 
restrictions18
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 that prevented further supplies of land and housing. For this reason, land 
prices soared to 60% in the early 1980s (Figure 1.11). 
 
Figure 1.11. The Growth Rate of Land Prices in Korea 
Source: Korea Land Corporation 
                                            
17 The UGB was introduced in Seoul in 1971 as the Greenbelt Policy to prevent the unlimited 
expansion of the city. This policy contributed to blocking the urban sprawl problem, but caused soaring 
housing prices. 
 
18 The building-height restriction policies in Korea are mainly for security reasons. The Blue House, the 
President’s official residence, is in Gwanghwamun area, which is the core of downtown Seoul. Since 
the Korean War, there has been a strict policy that there should be no buildings in downtown Seoul that 
are higher than the Blue House. 
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All of these problems negatively affected the industrialization of the city, and as 
shown in Figure 1.12, the productivity of manufacturing sectors in Seoul and the Guro 
Industrial Complex (GIC), the biggest industrial complex within the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area, showed slow growth until 1988. 
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Figure 1.12. The Productivity of Manufacturing Firms in Seoul and the GIC 
 
Note: Productivity ($) = Output ($) / Laborer 
Source: Seoul Statistical Yearbook. Guro Statistical Yearbook 
 
     All of the above tables and figures, particularly Figure 1.12, indicate that Korea’s 
growth was stalled in the 1980s. Using the terms in Figure 1.5 or 1.6, Korea was 
somewhere at point b. According to Figure 1.6, the CME is required to escape from 
the stalled situation which would help it to approach the point c. What the Korean 
government did was launching a number of decentralization plans. First, the so-called 
the New City Development Plan was launched in 1989 to decentralize the highly 
concentrated population outside Seoul by providing 200,000 new housing units. Based 
on this plan, five New Cities, Bundang, Ilsan, Jungdong, Pyeongchon, and Sanbon, 
which are all beyond the boundaries of Seoul and located in the surrounding Gyeonggi 
provinces, were newly constructed in 1989. This plan was quite successful because the 
  
34 
 
cities were not too far from Seoul (25~30 km), and were followed by the construction 
of social infrastructures, such as subways (lines 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7), highways, hospitals, 
and secondary schools. For example, Subway Line 3 was extended to connect 
Bundang, southeast of Seoul, (opened in 1994) and Ilsan, northwest of Seoul (opened 
in 1996). Line 4 was extended into Pyeongchon and Sanbon in 1994, and Line 7 was 
extended into Jungdong in 2000. Moreover, a beltway was opened in 1999 circling 
outside Seoul and connecting all of these new cities (See Appendix 2 for a map of 
Seoul, the surrounding area of new cities, and transportation networks) 
     On top of population decentralization, industry decentralization policies have also 
been developed in the 1990s. For example, companies in the Guro Industrial Complex 
(GIC) were relocated and decentralized into nearby areas. Opened in 1967, the GIC 
was the first industrial complex in Korea. It was the base camp of Korea’s export-led 
development, focusing on labor intensive industries, such as textiles, in the 1960s and 
the 70s. It is even reported that the GIC alone accounted for 10% of Korea’s total 
export in the 1970 (SERI). However, as Seoul became more and more expanded, the 
GIC area, which used to be a suburban area of Seoul, became rapidly urbanized. As 
usual, congestion problems arose and land prices soared, and the GIC lost its 
competitiveness in the 1980s; the number of workers dropped from 73,000 in 1987 to 
25,000 in 1998, and the amount of export decreased from $4.2 billion in 1987 to $1.5 
billion in 1989.  
    In order to solve congestion problems and recover competitiveness, most labor 
intensive industries in the area had to move to rural areas where they could find 
cheaper land and lower-wage workers. Moreover, as Korea’s industrial comparative 
advantage turned gradually into a capital intensive one, the GIC itself became 
diversified and focused more on high-tech industry. As a result, the GIC changed its 
name into the Guro Digital Industrial Complex in 2000 and hosted many capital 
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intensive high-tech industries. Now, as shown in Table 1.5, the biggest business is IT 
industry, whereas the portion of textile industry is only 7%. 
 
Table 1.5. Types of Business in the GDIC (January 2007) (Unit : Number of 
Companies, Percent) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Guro District Office 
 
These decentralization policies worked well. The number of companies in the GIC has 
started increasing since the late 1990s (from 483 in 1998 to 6,711 in 2007), and the 
number of workers started increasing since then all the way up to 92,000 in 2007 
(SERI). Not only the GIC area but also the entire Seoul had better circumstances. In 
1995, Seoul recorded a negative population growth rate, the first time ever in its 
history, and the housing supply rate has increased sharply. Also, as shown in Figure 
2.10 and 2.11, the growth rate of the number of vehicles and land prices have slowed 
down since the 1990s. As a result, another round of industrialization has been initiated 
in the GIC and in the entire Seoul, and their productivities, or per capita output, have 
turned into a rapid increasing path since the 1990s (Figure 1.12). 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
     From spatial perspectives, this paper modifies the MSV model. The crucial part of 
this modification is the agglomeration capacity of a region. As long as external 
economies outweigh external diseconomies, economic profits will be an increasing 
function of n. On the other hand, when overheating or congestion problems become 
IT Animation Electrics Textile Paper Others Total 
4,364 18 43 427 246 1095 6193 
70% 0.3% 0.7% 7% 4% 18% 100% 
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significant, the profit will be a decreasing function of n, and the economy’s growth 
might be stalled.  
     Unlike the original model where only one-way direction was made (how a region 
can be pulled out of a poverty trap and approaches industrialization), this modification 
allows us to analyze not only the two extremes, but also the possibility of partial 
industrialization as an intermediate stage. As summarized in Figure 1.6, by 
introducing this partial industrialization, along with the Critical Minimum Effort and 
Critical Minimum Retreat, this paper develops the original idea of the MSV model 
into a much richer level by incorporating various scenarios. The examples of the five 
countries are used to demonstrate these scenarios: Mexico and South Korea is in the 
stage of leaving the stage of stalled partial industrialization phenomenon for a fuller 
industrialization; in Poland, heavy economic congestion to a certain urban poles 
resulted in a stalled growth; The Philippines is in the Critical Minimum Retreat and 
the economy has degraded into partial industrialization. More work is needed on this 
topic regarding policy implications. Since the agglomeration capacity is a crucial 
threshold determining whether a region will achieve industrialization, policies that 
reduces economic congestion problems will work as critical minimum effort.  Well 
established spatially connective policies, such as construction of spatial infrastructure 
(roads, bridges, etc), will reduce the cost of congestion and enhance the society’s 
welfare. Decentralization policies, as were effectively performed in Mexico and South 
Korea, will also solve the problem of stalled growth and contribute to moving forward 
to fuller industrialization.   
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APPENDIX 1: MODEL 
 
Consider labor, which is the only input in the MSV model. Assume the following: 
 
• Workers are contracted to receive wages for 8 hours of work per day, and must 
have leisure for 16 hours to preserve productivity, which will decline as their 
leisure time shrinks.  
• Workers can produce outputs only in the workplace. 
• Commuting takes from one hour up to a certain point h and increases by S 
minutes thereafter. In addition, half of the workers’ commuting time takes 
away from the number of work hours and the other half’s commuting time will 
take away from the number of leisure hours. 
• Wages are the same across firms and across sectors. 
 
In this framework, workers cannot work for the entire 8 hours due to commuting time, 
which is definitely a fixed cost. Fixed costs are normally composed of transportation 
costs and factor prices. In this model, there is no capital, so there is no rental rate, and 
wage is a fixed constant. Therefore, transportation costs, measured by commuting time, 
are the only fixed cost in this economy. More specifically, F can be defined as: 
 
                   F = time to commute(C) + money spent on commuting (M)                            
 
Suppose there is only one railway going to work and there is one huge train that can 
accommodate H people from sector 1,2,….h (H=l1+l2+...lh). Suppose also that 
workers live in the same town, and it takes one hour from home to work using this 
train, which is the only option for commuting. Until h sectors are clustered, all of the 
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workers can take the train, and they have the same one-hour-commute, half of which 
will be assumed to take away from work hours, resulting in a fixed cost. However, 
when the number of clustered sectors exceeds h, there will be more than H people 
waiting for the train. Therefore, the economy is supposed to have an extra small train 
that can accommodate li people from each sector. This small train will depart S 
minutes later. Since there is only one railway in this scenario, many commuters will 
need to wait an additional S minutes. Therefore, as more and more sectors join this 
cluster, commuting time will increase like a step function, from which fixed costs will 
keep increasing as well. Regarding money, suppose that commuters need to pay $m 
per train, regardless of its size and number of passengers. Therefore, money spent will 
decrease until n reaches h, and will be a constant function thereafter. 
     Now, let’s move onto productivity, α. This paper argues that α is also a function of 
n. More specifically,  
 
        α = leisure time (L) + knowledge spillover (K)                                               
 
Suppose that worker productivity is proportional to leisure time, which is dependent 
on the number of commuting minutes. Then, until h sectors get agglomerated, 
commuting time is fixed at one hour, and therefore, leisure time will be the same. 
However, commuting time will increase by S minutes when firms of additional sectors 
join the cluster. According to an assumption used in this paper, half of this will reduce 
leisure time and eventually, productivity. Suppose also that knowledge spillover is 
increasing at a slower rate. This is quite intuitive given that when there are no 
communications across sectors; the first information-sharing will significantly benefit 
their productivity, but this effect will not be very significant because more and more 
firms with a similar level of technology become localized. Additionally, suppose that 
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this externality will stop when n reaches h. The formal algebraic and graphical 
summary is as follows:       
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APPENDIX 2: SEOUL AND ITS SURROUNDING AREA 
 
 
 
Figure: Seoul, Incheon, and surrounding Gyeonggi-do Province: a highway map 
 
 
 
Figure: Seoul and the surrounding area of new cities: subway network 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA: IS BIG PUSH POSSIBLE? 
EVIDENCE FROM THE KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
IN NORTH KOREA 
 
Abstract 
This paper tests whether a Big Push for moving from a lower level equilibrium 
(poverty trap) to a higher one (industrialization) could occur in North Korea. The 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), in which some South Korean firms have just 
started doing business with North Korean labor, will be the main focus of this paper. 
Using the Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny Model, it will be argued that a successful 
launch of the KIC will bring about a spillover effect to the entire country, leading to 
industrialization and ending dependence on nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
     North Korea, once regarded as a successful communist state in the Far East, is one 
of the most devastated countries in the world, having severe food problems, a negative 
growth rate, and a decreasing budget. One of the biggest reasons that North Korea has 
fallen into a poverty trap is the collapse of the Soviet Union, its closest political ally 
and economic supporter, for the new Russia no longer backs North Korea. In order to 
get out of the trap, therefore, North Korea must find a partner to substitute for the 
former Soviet Union. A good candidate is South Korea, for the two Koreas share a 
common language, history, and culture. Moreover, since the historic summit meeting 
in 2000, there has been a variety of discussions on economic cooperation between 
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both Korean states. One of them is the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),19
     Getting out of the poverty trap and moving toward industrialization theoretically 
implies that North Korea’s economy has multiple equilibria. Based on this implication, 
the researcher will use the Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny model, which very effectively 
describes multiple equilibria in an economy. 
 in which 
some South Korean firms have just started doing business using North Korean labor. 
The KIC will be the main focus on this paper, and, in particular, this industrial 
complex will be a viable solution so North Korea can get out of the poverty trap and 
make a Big Push. 
     It will be argued, both theoretically and empirically, that the MSV Model’s 
prediction is such that the KIC is the key for reaching a higher equilibrium. Moreover, 
the successful launch of the KIC project will be a stepping stone for North Korea to 
open its door to the outer world, leading to industrialization and ending its dependence 
on nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. 
     This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the 
original basis of the MSV model. After describing the current state of poverty in North 
Korea in Section 3, Section 4 uses the KIC and the MSV model to demonstrate the 
possibility of escaping from the trap. This section also provides two approaches for 
estimating productivity of the KIC (α in the MSV model) – an empirical approach by 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, and the relative approach by comparing 
the productivity of the KIC with other regions in the country. Section 5 discusses 
further spillover effects, and Section 6 concludes this paper.  
                                            
19 This complex is located in North Korea, just six miles north of the border. The Korean characters for 
Kaesong are 개성. Kaesong, Gaesong, Kaesung, Gaesung, Kaeseong, and Gaeseong all stand for the 
same city. 
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2. Description of the Model 
 
See Section 2 in Chapter 2. 
 
3. The Poverty Trap in North Korea 
 
3.1. Current Situation 
 
     Before applying the MSV Model to North Korea’s development, let us check the 
country’s current situation. Table 2.1 obviously reveals that this country has fallen into 
a poverty trap. But for a few recent years, the economy has grown negatively, and the 
per capita income of 2004 was less than it was 13 years ago.  
 
Table 2.1. North Korea’s population, GNI, And GNI per capita 
 
 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Population (1,000) 21,123 21,543 21,810 22,082 22,253 22,522 
GNI ($billon) 20.5 22.3 17.7 15.8 15.7 18.4 
GNI/capita ($) 969 1,034 811 714 706 818 
Source: Bank of Korea 
 
     In such a situation, the country’s state budget keeps decreasing. In spite of this 
dilemma, the regime continues to spend approximately 30 percent of its total budget 
($5.78 billion in 1997) on military expenses, which results in a smaller distribution of 
capital to its people (Ministry of Unification 2006). 
     The energy problem is also serious. As shown in Table 2.2, the decreasing 
production of coal and electrical power with the rapid curtailment of petroleum 
imports contributes greatly to the country’s declining energy output.  
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Table 2.2. The energy supply situation in North Korea 
 
 Coal Production 
(million tons) 
Import of Crude 
Petroleum (million tons) 
Electricity Production 
(billion KWh) 
1990 33.15 2.52 27.7 
1992 29.20 1.52 24.7 
1994 25.40 0.91 23.1 
1996 21.00 0.94 21.3 
1998 18.60 0.37 17.0 
2000 22.50 0.29 19.4 
2002 21.90 0.44 19.0 
2004 22.80 0.39 20.2 
 
Source: Bank of Korea. Estimates on North Korea’s economic indicators (in Korean) 
 
Moreover, the steel, cement, and chemical industries, which play a central role in the 
North Korean economy, all suffer greatly from the low stocks of available energy. A 
South Korean who recently visited Pyongyang revealed in his essay that the most 
luxurious hotel in Pyongyang turned off most lights and stopped elevator operation 
(Oh 2001, pp. 2-3). Figure 2.1 reflects this situation; unlike the bright nights in South 
Korea, North Korea is almost completely dark.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Image of North Korea at Night 
 
Source: Global Security 
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3.2. Falling into the Trap: Why?  
 
     One interesting fact is that the North Korean economy was not so bad until the 
1980s. Like all of the postwar Communist states, North Korea undertook massive state 
investment in heavy industry and state infrastructure as soon after it was independent 
of Japan. Also, unlike the South, land reform in North Korea by the Kim Il Song 
regime was successful, and the country became rapidly stabilized under his control. As 
a result, North Korea was in a superior situation in contrast to South Korea in the 
1950s and 60s; the conventional wisdom is that the North’s per capita income 
exceeded the South’s until the 1970s. Nonetheless, North Korea’s economy started to 
degenerate in the 1980s and ultimately collapsed in the 90s. Figure 2.2 reflects this 
change.  
 
Figure 2.2. GDP growth rate of North Korea (percent) 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics On-line 
 
     One of the internal reasons for this crisis lies in a variety of problems typical of 
centrally planned economies (CPEs), exacerbated by the so-called Juche ideology, 
first proclaimed by Kim Il Sung in 1957 as the fundamental principle of North Korea’s 
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state management that emphasized self-reliance. This ideology, though, resulted in an 
autarkic economy in North Korea, with an international trade share (exports and 
imports) of approximately 12 percent20
     Nevertheless, the CPE and the Juche ideology were fundamental philosophies even 
when the North Korean economy was relatively successful in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Therefore, these internal factors — CPE, Juche, and autarky — are not sufficient to 
explain the recent crisis. An examination of external factors provides a stronger 
explanation for Korea’s current state.  
 of its total GDP, well below the 50 to 55 
percent observed in South Korea (Noland 2000, p. 66). This autarkic situation is very 
vulnerable to internal shock in which the supply of necessities is blocked. For example, 
there was a big flood in July and August 1995. As a result of the worst catastrophe 
North Korea had ever had, 5.4 million people were displaced, 330,000 hectares of 
agricultural land were destroyed, and 1.9 million tons of grains were lost (Noland 
2000, p. 175). The country’s autarkic policies, coupled with its heavy-industry 
oriented policy causing fragile agriculture, turned the flood problem into a severe food 
problem.  
     A big external shock was the crash of North Korea’s principle benefactor, the 
Soviet Union, and the subsequent breakup of the Eastern Bloc. The trade volume 
between North Korea and Russia dropped sharply in 1991; the decline in imports from 
Russia was equal to 40 percent of North Korea’s total imports. Aid from the Soviet 
Union, which accounted for a large portion of the North Korean budget, came to a stop 
in 1986. Since then, strangely enough, North Korea had even supported the Soviet 
Union for a few years. The collapse of the former Soviet Union was a big shock to 
                                            
20 As will be discussed soon, this 12 percent figure is exclusively dependent upon trade with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Bloc. Because of this bias, North Korea had a particularly disastrous shock when its 
partners’ economies collapsed. 
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many third world countries. However, the shock was particularly disastrous to North 
Korea whose international trade pattern was extremely biased toward communist 
countries, particularly to the Soviet Union. After being cut off from international 
markets, North Korea interacted very little with capitalist countries like the United 
States. With this bias, the economic hardships of their partners transmitted directly 
into North Korea.                  
     From an economic perspective, North Korea’s stability until the 1980s and its 
collapse since then can be described as a movement from one equilibrium to another. 
Until the 1980s, North Korea’s relatively stable economy was on a Production 
Possibility Frontier (PPF), a Walrasian equilibrium in which the first welfare theorem 
is satisfied. However, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, combined with no 
diversification trade patterns and severe natural disasters of flood and famine, resulted 
in the movement of the equilibrium toward the inside of the PPF where resources are 
not efficiently utilized.21
     Using Nelson’s terminology, requoted by Basu, this is a “low level equilibrium 
trap” (Basu, pp.17-18); it is stable in itself, meaning that any small deviation from this 
point does not change the equilibrium. It is by the so-called Big Push that the economy 
can go back to the pareto-efficient equilibrium point.  
 
 
4. Escaping from the Trap: The MSV Model Revisited 
 
4.1. The Kaesong Industrial Complex  
 
     Investigating how and why North Korea fell into a trap should generate ideas about 
                                            
21 Note that the PPF does not shift inward. These negative shocks are mostly external, and North 
Korea’s resources including physical capital and human resources are not destroyed. 
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how it can get out of it. Falling into the trap was largely due to the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union that had once been the North’s major trading partner and 
supporter. Therefore, finding another partner to substitute for the former Soviet Union 
is very important for North Korea; success toward these ends will be a stepping stone 
for the Big Push. In this regard, economic cooperation with South Korea in the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is suggested as a solution.   
     Opened in December, 2004, the KIC is a special administrative zone in North 
Korea being developed as a collaborative economic cooperation with South Korea. As 
shown in Figure 2.3, it is located only six miles north of the Korean Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) with direct road and rail access to South Korea and within an hour’s 
drive from Seoul and Incheon International Airport.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Location of the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
Source: Hyundai Asan 
      
     The combination of South Korean technologies with North Korean cheap labor is 
definitely a pareto improvement for both countries. North Korea has high quality labor 
and human resources; the country has an eleven-year compulsory education system 
with a 98% literacy rate with 96% of the age cohort enrolling in the primary and 
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secondary educational system. This rate is far above the average of countries with 
similar incomes (GNI/capita: $914 (year 2004)). The recent famine might have 
deteriorated the “hardware” of the education environment, but in terms of “software,” 
its human resources are still highly available. Moreover, the fact that the two sides 
speak the same language and share the same culture and history makes the North 
Korean market even more attractive. 
     Before the KIC, South Korean firms used to invest mostly in China or in Southeast 
Asia because of the geographical proximity and relatively low wages, but since the 
KIC Project was launched, a large number of South Korean firms have shown great 
interest in making way for North Korea, which is significantly closer than China or 
South East Asia and has significantly lower wages than its neighbor to the south 
($57.5 per month on average in the KIC, which is 1/30 of South Korea). This is 
obviously encouraging news for many South Korean firms, so when this plan was first 
publicly announced, 1806 firms from various sectors applied to enter the KIC. Due to 
competition for land, however, 54 of them were ultimately approved. Nonetheless, it 
was expected that approximately 300 South Korean firms with 100,000 North Korean 
workers would participate by 2007. The entire complex is scheduled for completion in 
2012, covering 25 square miles with 1000 firms employing 350,000 people (Hyundai 
Asan). 
 
4.2. Application of the MSV Model 
 
     The KIC is a very good source for applying the MSV Model to North Korea. It 
seems that the MSV Model is not a good tool to describe the multiple equilibria of the 
last Stalinist economy where there existed very few leading monopolist firms. 
However, the reclusive country now has a number of South Korean firms within its 
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territory. Assuming these South Korean firms are monopolists, the MSV Model will be 
very useful.  
     First, it is known that 1806 companies are interested in the KIC and have applied 
for the project. Therefore, it can be seen that k is the number of sectors by which these 
1806 firms are sorted. The maximum capacity of the KIC area is 80 million square 
yards, and the predicted maximum number of firms within this area is 2000 (Hyundai 
Asan). This paper assumes that 1806 is very similar to the maximum capacity of 
2000.22
     Recall that the wage of the fringe firm is normalized to 1 and that of the monopolist 
firm to 1+v. Also recall that 
 Furthermore, n is the number of sectors of South Korean firms that actually 
entered the KIC and L is the total number of workers in the k sectors.  
11 vb
α
+
= − . It has been reported that wages in the KIC 
are two times higher than the average wages in North Korea (approximately $5023
2 21b α
α α
−
= − =
 in 
the KIC and $25 on average) (Ministry of Unification). Thus, these prices can be 
normalized to 2 and 1, respectively, regarding v as 1. From here, . 
Because α is greater than 1, b is smaller than 1. Also, b was assumed to be positive to 
guarantee a positive profit. Because
2
20 and 0
db b
dα α
∂
> <
∂
, the function is slowly 
increasing. Therefore,α, which refers to the productivity of monopolist firms, must be 
the case in which  
                                            
22 Note that k is not the number of sectors that already exist in the area of Kaesong City. This paper 
assumes that it is only South Korean firms that play a role as monopolists. Preexisting North Korean 
firms in the neighborhood of the KIC are assumed to be fringe firms. 
 
23 Even though the official wage is $50, firms give $57.5 per worker to the North Korean authorities 
(Hyundai Asan). Then they take $7.5 as their revenue and give basic necessities (food, clothing, etc.) 
worth $50 to the workers.  
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                                                           α>224
 
                                                            (1) 
The model says that ( ) ( - ) - (1 ) ( )n b L nF F v k Fn v bχ = + + +  determining the sign 
of the profit of monopolist firms. Now, v is known to be 1. Rewriting χ(n), 
 
                                                  ( ) 2n bL Fk Fnχ = − +                                        (2) 
 
χ(n)>0 if 2 2Fk bL bLn k
F F
−
> = − . Since 0db
dα
> , an increase in α results in an 
increase in b a decrease in 2 bLk
F
− . Therefore, the larger the value of α is, the smaller 
the 2 bLk
F
−  becomes, requiring fewer monopolist firms to enter the market to get a 
positive profit. From (1), α>2. This range can be narrowed down by considering the 
multiplicity of equilibrium. To get multiple equilibria and to be consistent with the 
MSV Model, it must be the case that χ(1) = bL-2Fk+F <0 and χ(k) = bL-Fk > 0. 
Because 2b α
α
−
= , rewriting and solving for α, we get 
                                           
2 2
2
L L
L Fk L F Fk
α< <
− + − 25
 
                                   (3) 
Comparing (1) and (3), 2L
L Fk−
- 2 >0 if 
 
                                                                L>Fk                                                        (4) 
                                            
24 This is consistent with w>αλ, which is a profit maximization problem of a monopolist firm in the 
MSV model. By simply plugging in w=1 and λ=2, the exact same result is achieved. 
 
25 Because k>1, (L+F-2Fk) – (L-Fk) = F-Fk < 0. Indeed, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-
hand side. 
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Under condition (4), (3) is left, finally, as a range of α. This result is achieved only 
knowing that v=1, not knowing other parameters including L, F, and k. Further 
research on these parameters will make it possible to get an estimated value of α. 
 
4.3. Estimating α: An Empirical Approach 
 
     Initially, 15 firms from different sectors entered the KIC in the demonstration area 
(shibom danji), followed by the entrance of another 23 firms in the main area (bon 
danji). Table 2.3 introduces the firms that entered the KIC; the original 15 firms make 
up the first 15 rows, followed by the rest of the firms. Currently, all 15 original firms 
in the demonstration area and three firms in the main area are producing goods 
(Ministry of Unification). 
 
Table 2.3. Companies in the KIC (October, 2006) 
 
Name Goods & Sector Fj (Korean Won) lj (people) 
xj  (Korean 
Won) Fj1 Fj2 
Samduk 
Trading shoes 5,393,390 117,004 1,469 8,997,868 
Shinwon general clothing 3,068,230 117,004 563 8,528,785 
S.J.Tech semiconductor parts 4,559,701 117,004 195 4,264,392 
Jaeyoung 
SoluTech 
auto parts,digital 
components 3,042,644 117,004 193 5,330,490 
Magic 
Micro lamp assembly 2,022,388 58,560 55 3,198,294 
Munchang aircraft clothing 3,406,183 78,048 669 5,714,286 
Yong-in 
Elec transformer, coil n.a. 117,004 149 4,264,392 
Daehwa 
F&P 
fuel pumps, 
polyurethane  1,973,348 58,560 181 5,415,778 
Taesung 
Group 
makeup 
goods(lipstick, 6,328,358 117,004 562 14,392,324 
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 Table 2.3. (Continued)   
Hosan Ace air purifier, dust collector n.a. 48,000 75 2,771,855 
Sonoko 
Cusine kitchen supplies 1,443,497 48,000 420 4,797,441 
Romanson watch 6,761,194 125,760 782 17,590,618 
TS 
Precision 
semiconductor 
mold  die set n.a. 78,048 54 2,985,075 
JC Com optical fiber cable n.a. 85,344 98 4,584,222 
Bucheon 
Ind wire harness 4,708,955 117,004 499 7,995,736 
M&S ski gloves, snow board gloves n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,010,661 
Sunghwa 
Trading socks n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,609,808 
Cotton 
Club underwear (naeui) n.a. n.a. 223 2,771,856 
Millions bag, toy n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,264,392 
Rok Sec 
Garments 
military uniform, 
sanitary clothes n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,279,318 
Artrang leather goods, mobile charger n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,396,588 
Jason 
Group DVD, PDP, phone n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,396,588 
Ivory sports wear n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,264,392 
Sudo Corp handkerchief, scarf n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,731,343 
Bedding 
Land bedding supplies n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Source: Hyundai Asan(www.hyundai-asan.com), Kaesong Industrial District 
Management Committee (www.kidmac.com), Ministry of Unification 
(www.unikorea.go.kr), Samduk Trading (www.shoemaker.co.kr), Shinwon 
(www.sw.co.kr), SJ Tech (www.sjseal.com), Jaeyoung Solutec (www.jysolutec.com) 
Magic Micro (www.magickr.com), Yong-in Electronics (www.samsungweb.co.kr/YE), 
Daewha Fuel &Pump (www.daewha21c.com), Taesung Group 
(www.makeuptaesung.com), Hosan Ace (www.hosanace.co.kr), Living Art 
(www.cusinware.com),  Romanson (www.romanson.co.kr), TS Precision 
(www.tsprecision.co..kr), JC Com (www.jccomn.com), M&S (www.yokokorea.co.kr), 
Sunghwa (www.sunghwa.com), Cotton Club (www.cotton-club.co.kr), Artrang  
(www.artrang.co.kr), Jason Group (www.jasonkorea.com), Ivory (myivory.co.kr), Sudo 
Corp (www.sudocorp.co.kr), Bedding Land (www.beddingland.com),  
 
Fj (fixed cost)= Fj1 (cost of factory construction) + Fj2 (rent of land for 50 years, 
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$48/m2), measured by Korean won, converted into U.S. dollar ($1=938 won, as of 
11/17/06), lj : number of workers, xj : output per month (Exact amount is not available 
for each firm’s security reason.  Therefore, each firm’s predicted expenditures, for 
initial investment, submitted to Hyundai Asan, was used.  A strong assumption is made 
here; rational firms’ predicted initial expenditures will be the same as their two-year 
revenue.  This assumption is based on the fact that some firms in the KIC exceeded 
break-even point after their first two years’ business in the KIC.)    
 
Note: Among 38 firms, there are some firms that are in the same sectors.  In this case, 
to be consistent with the MSV Model, only one firm per sector with bigger size or 
having more information is introduced 
 
Table 2.3 is not directly applicable to the situation and needs to be modified for the 
following reasons. First, Fj is measured by dollars and lj is the number of people. To 
overcome this unit difference, this paper converts the number of people into wage 
income. Since their wage of $50 is normalized to 2, the modified result is achieved by 
simply multiplying lj by 2. Second, while their wage of $50 is what they receive each 
month, Fj is the one-time payment and firms do not pay this for the following 50 years. 
Therefore, another multiplication of lj by 600 (12 months*50 years) is required. 
Appendix has the modified version of lj, which is 1,200 times bigger than the original 
one. Third, Fj is the actual amount of money, without normalization ($25 = 1). 
Therefore, to be consistent with this paper, Fj needs to be scaled down and Appendix 
reflects these changes; the Fj here is derived by dividing the original one by 25. Finally, 
xj should also be measured in monetary terms. As explained above, xj in Table 2.3 
reveals the approximate annual revenue of each firm. Therefore, multiplication of 50 
years and scaling down by 25 (normalization) will follow, which is actually twice the 
original amount. Based on this adjustment, α can be estimated by the equation xj=α(lj-
Fj). 
     A simple regression analysis was conducted. The results are provided in Table 2.4, 
In order to stick to the original model, a constant term was ignored. The α, a slope of 
the regression line, is 11.360. Because L and k are not known, it is not clear whether 
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the estimated α is within the range of (9), in which these firms are expected to gain 
positive profits, and achieve the higher level of a Nash Equilibrium. However, the 
estimated α satisfies rough conditions of (7), at least, increasing the hope of the KIC’s 
profitability.  
 
Table 2.4. Statistical tests of the productivity of 25 firms in the KIC 
 
Determinants (no constant) Estimated Coefficient 
(α,Productivity) 
t-statistic 
lj-Fj 11.36 (3.791)** 
R2 0.615  
 
**= significant at 99% confidence level 
Note: This result is based on data of Table 2.3, modified in Appendix. Following the 
original model, no constant was used. Independent variable is xj  
 
4.4. Estimating α: A Relative Approach 
 
     According the MSV model, whether an economy reaches a higher level equilibrium 
of industrialization or stays in a poverty trap depends on each monopolist firm’s 
profits. If each firm produces a significantly large output per given labor, the chances 
for reaching industrialization are high. However, due to the limited data source, the 
results in Table 2.4 do not clearly confirm whether α, productivity in the KIC, is 
superior enough to create industrialization in the region.  
     In order to analyze α further, this section takes a relative approach. That is, 
productivity of the KIC will be divided by that of the entire country, assuming that all 
of the high-tech monopolist firms are agglomerated in the KIC and other areas have 
only fringe firms. Because the MSV model assumes that fringe firms have a 45-degree 
line production function, we can assume that productivity (measured by output per 
worker) for the whole of North Korea is 1, and the relative productivity of the KIC can 
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be derived accordingly. 
     As for the KIC, three-year time series data on the total output and labor are used, 
which are summarized in Table 2.5. Unlike Table 2.3, which are cross-sectional data 
for October 2006, Table 2.5 has monthly data from 2005 through 2008. As seen in this 
table, monthly output has increased more than five times from $336,000 in April 2005 
to $1,906,000 in April 2008. In the same period of time, the number of North Korean 
workers in the KIC has increased more than 13 times to 27,341from 2006. Overall, as 
is shown in Figure 2.4, per capita output has increased from $167 all the way up to 
$1,063 in July 2007 and was reduced to $697 in April 2008. Because the MSV 
model’s only input is labor, this per capita output can be interpreted in the model as 
productivity.  
 
Table 2.5. Monthly statistics for the KIC (04/2005 – 04/2008) 
 
Year Month Output ($1000) 
Export 
($1000) 
Export/ 
Output (%) 
Worker 
(people) 
Output/ 
Worker ($) 
2005 
4 336 38 11.31 2006 167 
5 441 64 14.51 2335 189 
6 437 5 1.14 3607 121 
7 775 37 4.77 4036 192 
8 1193 135 11.32 4263 282 
9 2051 181 8.83 4712 435 
10 2844 141 4.96 5265 540 
11 2942 138 4.69 5641 522 
12 3382 127 3.76 6013 562 
2006 
1 3396 655 19.29 6050 561 
2 3792 661 17.43 6103 621 
3 5209 964 18.51 6541 796 
4 4350 1020 23.45 6874 633 
5 5143 1131 21.99 7534 683 
6 5508 1624 29.48 7871 700 
7 5515 2183 39.58 7984 691 
8 6811 2219 32.58 8561 796 
9 7621 2240 29.39 8879 858 
10 7555 2213 29.29 9465 798 
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Table 2.5. (Continued) 
  
11 8868 2421 27.30 10345 857 
12 9969 2494 25.02 11160 893 
2007 
1 11962 2717 22.71 11330 1056 
2 10355 2502 24.16 11778 879 
3 13281 3161 23.80 12492 1063 
4 12460 2996 24.04 13070 953 
5 14388 3510 24.39 15147 950 
6 15058 3307 21.96 15584 966 
7 14903 2818 18.91 16607 897 
8 15697 3261 20.77 17699 887 
9 17107 3128 18.28 17671 968 
10 20905 4234 20.25 19502 1072 
11 19265 4236 21.99 21053 915 
12 19398 3799 19.58 22804 850 
2008 
1 18873 3202 16.97 22778 829 
2 17677 4322 24.45 23529 751 
3 24220 5753 23.75 25930 934 
4 19060 2997 15.72 27341 697 
Source: Output, Export, Worker: KIDMAC. Others: author’s calculation 
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Figure 2.4. Per capita output in the KIC 
 
In order to interpret whether this per capita output (or productivity) of the KIC is large 
enough for the region to reach industrialization, a similar analysis should be conducted 
using the dataset for the whole country to compare the result with that of the KIC. 
However, data accessibility of the hermit kingdom is very limited. In particular, data 
on the number of workers in manufacturing sectors and their ouput levels are unknown. 
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The only available data are the number of employees by sector, released only once by 
the North Korea Census Bureau (requoted by Choi), summarized in Table 2.6.   
Table 2.6. Number of workers by sector in North Korea 
 
Sector 1993 (thousand) 1995 (thousand) 1999 (thousand) Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
1 4118 1922 2197 4284 2001 2283 4410 2063 2347 
2 3382 1718 1664 3454 1751 1703 3567 1806 1761 
3 464 352 112 460 350 110 482 367 115 
4 402 285 117 415 294 121 434 310 124 
5 509 161 348 514 161 353 529 169 360 
6 844 339 504 863 348 515 886 356 530 
7 251 153 98 258 157 101 265 161 104 
8 1035 631 403 966 612 354 954 614 340 
Total 11005 5562 5443 11214 5674 5540 11527 5846 5681 
 
Source: Choi 
1: Manufacture, 2: Agriculture, 3: Construction, 4: Transport, 5: Commerce,             
6: Health, 7: Administration, 8: Other 
 
     This paper uses the figure 4,410,000, the number of workers in the manufacturing 
sector because first, it reflects the most recent data, and second, the country went 
through a great famine and arduous march in the mid 1990s, so data for 1993 and 1995 
may not reflect reality after the period of famine. 
     Fortunately, data on output are easily accessible; the Bank of Korea releases data 
annually on total and sectoral GDP of North Korea, available from 1990 to 2007. In 
order to be consistent with the data on the number of workers, this paper uses data for 
1999, which is provided in Table 2.7.  
 
Table 2.7. GDP of North Korea in 1999 (total and sectoral) 
 
Agri-
culture, 
Fishery 
Mining 
Manufacture Elec-
tricity
, Gas 
Cons 
truc-
tion 
Ser-
vice Gov’t Other Total Light Heavy 
5872 1365 1144 2272 849 1142 6046 4268 1788 18688 
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Source: The Bank of Korea 
Unit: 1 billion South Korean Won (KRW) (approximately 1 million USD) 
     As shown in Table 2.3, almost all of the products made in the KIC are from light 
industry. So, if we want to stick to the comparison between light industrial goods in 
the KIC and in all of North Korea, 1,144 billion Won or 1,144 million USD can be 
used as the output of the whole country, opposed to the output in the KIC. Then, per 
capita output of North Korea is $259, which is $1,144 million divided by 4,410,000. 
On the other hand, if we focus on the fact that 4,410,000 people work in all 
manufacturing sectors, including both light and heavy industry, $1,144 million plus 
$2,272 million, which is $3,416 million, can be used as the total output for the country, 
so the per capita output of North Korea is $774, which is $3,416 million divided by 
4,410,000. See Table 2.8 for a summary. 
 
Table 2.8. Gross and per capita output of North Korea: Manufacturing sector 
 
Output ($million) Workers26
(million people) 
  Output/Worker ($) 
1144 (Light Industry) 4.41 259 
3416 (Entire mfg) 4.41 774 
 
     Now, the final step is to derive relative productivity by dividing output per worker 
in the KIC (provided in Table 6) by $259 and $774, respectively. Figure 6 shows the 
results. When $259 is used as the productivity of fringe firms in North Korea, this 
value is interpreted as slope 1 in the MSV model. Then,α, the slope of high-tech firms 
                                            
26 It is true that the number of workers in light industry sectors should be less than the number of 
workers in the whole manufacturing sector. However, the number of workers in light industry only is 
not available. Under the assumption that light industry is mostly labor intensive, this paper uses the 
same number of the workers as is employed in the entire manufacturing sectors.  Even though this is an 
obviously limited assumption, the reason for considering light industry is that most of goods made in 
the KIC are from light industry. By comparing the output of light industry in North Korea, I intended to 
derive a better result.   
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in the KIC, has exceeded 1 since September 2005, and been increasing. If $774 is used 
instead, the slope of high-tech firms in the KIC has been higher than 1 since August 
2006. Even though they show a slightly decreasing pattern these days, the relative 
productivities of the area are mostly greater than 1. With a higher value of α (greater 
than 1), the prediction of the MSV Model is such that all of the entering firms will be 
more likely to gain positive profits, which enables achievement of the higher level of 
the Nash Equilibrium. 
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Figure 2.5. Relative productivity of the KIC 
 
4.5. A Closed Economy? A Critical Assumption of the MSV Model 
 
      Last, but not unimportantly, the isolation of the KIC should be checked, because 
one of the very important aspects of the MSV model is that it assumes a closed 
economy with no trade. With rapid globalization, this assumption is unrealistic to 
many countries. However, North Korea is one of the most reclusive countries in the 
world, and there is more room to apply the MSV model in this research.  
     In order to check a closed economy, this paper provides the major countries’ tariff 
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rates on North Korea. Even though the KIC is operated by South Korean firms, most 
production is carried out by North Korean workers in North Korean territory, thus, 
many countries still regard made-in-KIC goods as North Korean goods. For example, 
according the recent Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between South Korea and the 
United States, the U.S. government did not agree to approve KIC goods as South 
Korean goods. Unfortunately, North Korea is still categorized as a terrorist country, 
and North Korea’s trades are sanctioned by many countries through very high tariff 
rates (see Table 2.9). This is not a favorable situation for the KIC itself, but it does 
create a workable environment for this research to preserve the assumption of a closed 
economy and to apply the MSV model.  
 
Table 2.9. National tariff rates on South and North Korean goods 
 
U.S. 
S.Korea 
Normal Trade Relations (NTR): Column 1 Tariff applied 
[clothing(0~32%); shoes(0~48%); bags(5.7~20%); toys(0%); 
accessories(0~11%); automobile parts(0~3%); computer 
parts(0%); electronic goods(0~15%)] 
N.Korea 
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, Imposing economic 
sanctions since 1950 
Column 2 Tariff applied [clothing(35~90%); shoes(20~84%); 
bags(40~90%); toys(70%); accessories(45~110%); 
automobile parts(25%); computer parts(35%); electronic 
goods(25~80%)] 
Canada S.Korea General Preferential Tariff applied (0~7%) N.Korea No economic sanctions, General Tariff applied (35%) 
Japan 
S.Korea WTO member rate applied [clothing(9.1~10%); leather goods(3~15%); 
N.Korea 
Export to North Korea prohibited, Uninsured North Korean 
ship not allowed to disembark: Statutory rate applied 
[clothing (11~16%); shoes(two times higher than WTO 
member rate); leather goods(4~20%)] 
Other 
Countries 
No differential tariff rate to North & South Korean goods: Countries 
examined (EU, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, China, Taiwan, Singapore, 
India, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Pakistan, Myanmar, 
Bangladesh, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile, 
Mexico, Panama, Russia, Ukraine, UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Saudi 
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Arabia, Nigeria, South Africa, Kuweit 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) 
     In this not-so-favorable global environment, the proportion of exports among the 
total production in the KIC is declining. It was once peaked at 40% in June, 2007, but 
is now stuck somewhere 20% these days (see Figure 2.6). Most exports are biased 
toward the  EU countries where no differential tariff rates are applied.       
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Figure 2.6. Portion of exports out of total production in the KIC (%) 
 
5. Spillover Effect: another Maquiladora? 
 
5.1. Factor Movements 
  
     Currently, approximately 10,000 North Korean people are working in the KIC 
(Hyundai Asan).  This number is expected to increase up to 350,000 by the year 2012.  
Their wage is more than twice as much as other North Koreans ($57.527
                                            
27 For convenient reason, this wage is assumed to be $50, and in this paper, it is normalized to 2.  
 and $25, 
respectively).  Assuming that the KIC workers interact with people outside, wage 
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discrepancies will be more distinctive, a fact which may push the country toward wage 
equality.   
     Moreover, the policy of North Korean authority for the KIC is becoming more and 
more decentralized28
     Movement of physical capital is also important.  Unlike South Korea, North Korea 
has abundant natural resources including iron ore and coal.  Also, it has a moderate oil 
refinery industry
.  By working for South Korean firms and interacting with South 
Korean people, they are experiencing a market economy system.   
29
 
 whose capacity is approximately four million tons per year.  
Utilizing this capital is pareto improvement to both Koreas; South Korean firms can 
use the resources with lower transportation cost, and the industry in the North related 
to these fields will gain positive profit.  
5.2. Facilitation of Other Complexes (Rasin-Sonbong and Shinuiju) 
 
     The KIC is not North Korea’s first attempt of industrial complex.  In 1993, North 
Korea undertook its first attempt in the Rajin-Sonbong area, a remote Northeastern 
part of the country where the borders of Korea, China and Russia meet.  A subsequent 
project followed in Shinuiju in 2002 to absorb Chinese capital (See Figure 2.7 for 
geographical explanation). 
     Unfortunately, these projects have not been successful.  Low quality of 
infrastructure and a bad credit rating due to political insecurity drove risk-averse 
                                            
28 Currently, South Korean firms pay workers’ wages in US dollars to a North Korean authority, and the 
workers receive ration tickets, such as food stamps, from the authority.  However, it is suggested that 
South Korean firms directly give them wages.  If it happens, a merit-based pay system will be expected 
to follow. 
 
29  The oil refinery industry is very important in a country’s development.  On top of the spillovers from 
the successful KIC, North Korea may gain another spillover by the development of the oil refinery 
industry, which has been observed by many countries in their process of development.  See Isard (2005) 
for relevant case studies on Puerto Rico.   
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investors away.   
     So far, its third attempt in Kaesong has had much better result than those previous 
ones.  If the KIC becomes very successful, there may be incentive to invest in 
complexes in Rajin-Sonbong and Shinuiju as well.  Ideal situation will be such that 
industrialization of all of three places has a spillover effect on the country from every 
direction.  
 
 
Figure 2.7.  A Map of North Korea and Three Industrial Complexes 
 
5.3. The KIC as another Maquiladora 
 
     Maquiladoras are the Mexican version of the KIC.  A Maquiladora is a factory that 
imports materials and equipment and usually re-exports the assembled product to the 
originating country.  With the end of the U.S. Bracero Program, which allowed 
Mexican immigrants to find temporary agricultural work in the United States 
(Wikipedia), the Mexican government was looking for subsitute industries to absord 
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the unemployed Mexican laborers.  As a solution, Maquiladora industries were 
established in 1961 in border cities of Mexico, located within 20 km of the U.S. border, 
Maquiladoras’ achievement was initially unimpressive.  Since then, however, 
Maquiladoras has grown rapidly.  Active investment from the U.S., cheap Mexican 
labor, geographic proximity to the U.S., and strong support from the Mexican 
government are major factors of their success.  Maquiladoras’ achievement brought a 
spillover effect to Mexico, and its industrial area expanded accordingly from some 
border cities to the entire country.  According to Table 2.10, Exports of goods from 
Maquiladoras now explain more than 40% of total Mexican exports. 
 
Table 2.10. Maquiladoras Industry 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mexican Statistical Agency (INEGI), requoted by Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy 
 
 
      Considering Maquiladoras’ success, the KIC is likely to have a bright future.  
North Korea’s cheap labor, South Korean firms’ active participation, and proximity 
from Seoul (1 hour drive) are very similar to the favorable conditions of Maquiladoras.  
Moreover, if the other two complexes in Rajin-Sonbong and Shinuiju are to be 
 number of firms number of workers 
exports 
($million) rate of exports(%) 
1970 120 20,327 83 6.4 
1975 454 67,213 332 10.8 
1980 578 119,546 772 5.1 
1985 789 217,544 1,268 5.8 
1990 1,924 470,000 15,833 37.0 
1995 2,265 648,263 14,151 37.0 
2000 3,655 1,291,232 79,467 47.8 
2004 2,811 1,111,801 87,547 46.4 
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successful as well, North Korea will also attract investment from China.  Then, with 
South Korean firms from the south and China from the north, the reclusive country 
may reap great benefit throughout the country.  
6. Conclusion 
 
     The KIC project is expected to shift North Korea’s equilibrium from the current 
poverty trap to an efficient Walrasian level in which industrialization is initiated. 
However, this benefit is attainable only when North Korea makes maximum efforts to 
preserve the KIC and when the international community is supportive of this project. 
On North Korea’s part, the country should lower its land leasing prices. According to 
Table 2.3, the price to rent land for 50 years, which is $48/m,2 explains some of the 
firms’ fixed costs. Theoretically, lowering the rent will increase the likelihood of the 
KIC’s profitability and thus, it becomes highly likely that condition (10), L>Fk, would 
be satisfied. It is understandable that receiving higher rents is one of North Korea’s 
goals in opening its land to South Korean firms. Still, North Korea must show its 
willingness to compromise in order to encourage further investment from the South 
and thus bring higher profits to the North in the long run. In addition, North Korea 
must avoid bringing nuclear weapons to the bargaining table. The nuclear test done by 
North Korea in February 2007 made the international community even more hostile to 
Pyongyang. So, Pyongyang needs to make every effort possible to reduce nuclear risks 
and take an active role in the six-party talks. 
     Conversely, other countries should support the KIC project; the products that they 
manufacture must be referred to as those made in South Korea. The country of origin, 
whether the KIC goods are made in North Korea or in South Korea, is a very 
important issue. Three countries, the United States, Canada, and Japan, all of which 
are imposing higher tariffs on North Korea (See Table 2.9), are reluctant to approve 
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the KIC. If they maintain their current hostile policies toward North Korea, the KIC 
goods will not be competitive in these countries.  
     The results in Section 4 predict that North Korea can benefit economically from the 
KIC project; the estimated α demonstrates that firms are likely to gain positive profits, 
and the MSV model predicts that the KIC is likely to be industrialized. However, the 
politically precarious relationship between North Korea and other countries is a 
stumbling block to economic gains. Isolation policies can never be a solution, because, 
without normal economic relationships, North Korea has little choice but to depend 
more heavily on nuclear weapons. The success of the KIC will be the key to ending 
this vicious circle and a significant step toward world peace.  
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APPENDIX: MODIFIED VERSION OF TABLE 3.3: UNIT ADJUSTMENT 
(SOUTH KOREAN WON) 
 
 
Company Name Fj lj lj - Fj xj 
Samduk Trading 220,416 1,762,800 1,542,384 8,997,868 
Shinwon 127,409 675,600 547,591 8,528,785 
S.J.Tech 187,068 234,000 46,932 4,264,392 
Jaeyoung SoluTech 126,386 231,600 105,214 5,330,490 
Magic Micro 83,238 66,000 * 3,198,294 
Munchang 139,369 802,800 663,431 5,714,286 
Yong-in Elec n.a. 178,800 n.a. 4,264,392 
Daehwa F&P 81,276 217,200 135,924 5,415,778 
Taesung Group 257,814 674,400 416,586 14,392,324 
Hosan Ace n.a. 90,000 n.a. 2,771,855 
Sonoko CusineWare 59,660 504,000 444,340 4,797,441 
Romanson 275,478 938,400 662,922 17,590,618 
TS Precision n.a. 64,800 n.a. 2,985,075 
JC Com n.a. 117,600 n.a. 4,584,222 
Bucheon Ind 193,038 598,800 405,762 7,995,736 
M&S n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,010,661 
Sunghwa Trading n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,609,808 
Cotton Club n.a. 267,600 n.a. 2,771,856 
Millions n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,264,392 
Rok Sec Garments n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,279,318 
Artrang n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,396,588 
Jason Group n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,396,588 
Ivory n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,264,392 
Sudo Corp n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,731,343 
Bedding Land n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Note: Negative values of lj - Fj , which are not meaningful from the perspective of the 
MSV Model, were deleted. For the firms that do not have Fj2, only Fj1 is considered.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
REGIONAL INEQUALITY OF SOUTH KOREA 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes regional inequality in South Korea for the past two decades, using 
the Theil Index. Overall, regional inequality of the country has been growing. This 
paper further analyzes group-specific effects using the so-called ‘between’ and within’ 
group decomposition. The first round of decomposition indicates that the inequality 
between Honam and non-Honam has been declining, repudiating the claim that 
Honam has been discriminated against by other regions. However, this paper argues 
that the mean income convergence between the two regions is also associated not only 
industrial development in Honam but with population decrease in the region. 
Additionally, two more decompositions were conducted, revealing that the inequalities 
between Gangwon and non-Gangwon and between rural and urban have been rising. 
The paper then provides follow-up econometric analyses to test what the main factors 
are that affect regional inequality. The time series regression shows that physical 
capital increases inequality and human capital decreases inequality, but panel 
regressions, both fixed and random effect, draw different conclusions. Additionally, 
while the direct effect of trade openness on regional inequality is ambiguous, its 
indirect effects, interacting with physical and human capital, are all positive. This 
result is related with the idea of “asymmetric gains from trade” or “coordinated 
investment”.   
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1. Introduction 
 
     The relationship between economic growth and inequality has been addressed by 
many economists for a long time (Basu 2000). For example, Kuznets (1955) suggested 
the well-known inverted U-shaped curve such that economic inequality increases and 
then decreases over time with the country’s growth. Williamson (1965) applied 
Kuznet’s finding to the regional level and showed that regional inequality has the 
same inverted U-shaped relationship with economic growth. On the other hand, 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) found a negative relationship between inequality and 
growth using data on income distribution and land in a number of countries. 
     This paper is about regional inequality of South Korea. The country has been one 
of the “champions” of economic growth, with per capita GDP growth of 6% per year 
on average, which resulted in “tensfold” of per capita GDP in the past 40 years. These 
accomplishments in the past four decades are “unmatched” in history (Barro 2003).  
     How has this dramatic growth affected regional inequality of the country?  The 
World Bank’s East Asian Miracle reported that the so-called eight high performing 
Asian economies (HPAEs) – Japan, the “Four Tigers” (Hong Kong, The Republic of 
Korea, Singapre, and Taiwan), and the three newly industrializing economies (NIEs) 
of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) – achieved unusually low and 
declining levels of inequality, contrary to historical experience and contemporary 
evidence in other regions found by Kuznets (p.30). However, each country is 
heterogeneous in terms of history, political background, location, and land size, so 
each one may show different patterns of regional inequality. For example, South 
Korea’s economic development policies over the past decades have been biased 
toward Seoul region, Busan region, and the link between the two. These policies might 
have ignored other regions, which might have contributed increasing regional 
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inequality.   
     This paper examines the pattern of South Korea’s regional inequality, which is 
measured the difference of mean income among groups living in different provinces. 
One of the widely used methods in measuring regional inequality is the Theil Index, 
because it can be additively decomposed into within group inequality (W) and between 
group inequality (B).  In many cases, this between group inequality (B) is the only 
available resource to measure regional inequalities, and thus, deserves particular 
attention.   
     Shorrocks and Wan (2005) conceptualized regional inequality by focusing on the 
theoretical foundations of the between group inequality (B). Among the many 
interesting properties, a very important one is that B is between zero30
     In that light, this paper analyzes regional inequality and suggests a so-called 
decomposition method as an improved measurement to better capture the overall 
inequality. Based on Shorrocks and Wan’s conclusion (2005) that regional inequality 
increases as more groups are included and on Kanbur and Zhang’s observations (2000) 
 and total 
inequality. B is zero if there is only one group and B is equal to the total inequality if 
the number of the group is actually all individuals. From this property, it can be 
conjectured that the expected value of B increases with the number of groups. Then, a 
question arises about what the meaningful number of groups is. For example, if we 
measure the regional inequality of the United States, do we need to measure inequality 
among different states? Or different counties? etc. Moreover, Sorrocks and Wan 
(2005) also argued that the share of B out of total inequality averages only 12%. If this 
is true, analyzing this 12% portion may not be very meaningful in understanding 
overall inequality. 
                                            
30 It is true that one Theil element can have a negative value.  For example, if a mean income of a 
region is lower than the weighted average, its log value is negative, so, Theil index is negative.   
However, even in this case, the overall value with summation of different elements will be positive.  
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on China, this paper re-groups the existing sub-regions of Korea based on its political 
and historical background and examines how regional inequality has changed. 
     More specifically, this paper is interested in the decompositions of Honam & non-
Honam, Gangwon & non-Gangwon, and urban & rural. It is commonly believed that 
the Honam area, located in the southwest part of Korea, has fallen behind other 
regions because of political reasons. Gangwon Province is also behind in the process 
of economic development mainly due to geographic reasons. Last but not least, the 
urban-rural gap is also an important issue. All of these regional disparities will be 
considered in this paper in order to determine whether these decompositions serve as a 
better way of understanding overall inequality in the country.   
     This paper has the following findings: Overall, regional inequality in Korea has 
grown over the past two decades. However, decomposed inequality between Honam 
and non-Honam has been reduced, but further investigation shows that this declining 
gap is not only due to Honam’s industrial development but also to its decreasing 
population. Other decomposed inequalities (Gangwon & Non-Gangwon, and rural & 
urban) have been increasing. The follow-up econometric analyses reveal that, among 
three major variables affecting regional inequality, (trade openness, physical capital 
and human capital), trade openness is the most important factor, directly and indirectly. 
     This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 conceptualizes regional inequality, 
with a focus on between group inequality, using the Theil Index. Section 3 discusses 
South Korea’s overall regional inequality. Section 4 analyzes decomposition methods. 
Follow-up econometric analyses are provided in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the 
research. 
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2. Regional Inequality: Conceptualization and Decomposition 
 
     The rationale for preferring Theil’s T statistic is not that there is some inherent 
flaw with the other measures, but that Theil’s T has a more flexible structure that often 
makes it relatively more appropriate. If a researcher always had access to complete 
data at the individual level, then measures like the coefficient of variation or the Gini 
coefficient would usually be sufficient for describing inequality. However, in reality, 
individual data is rarely available, and researchers are asked to deal with aggregated 
data. In this case, Theil’s T statistic is often a more appropriate and theoretically sound 
tool (Inequality Project 2008). 
     The following formulae reveal the algebra behind Theil’s T. While these particular 
equations use income as the variable of interest, Theil’s T can address any number of 
quantifiable phenomena. When household data is available, Theil’s T is:  
 
where n is the number of individuals in the population, yp is the income of the person 
indexed by p, and y is the population’s average income. If every individual has 
exactly the same income, T will be zero. This represents perfect equality and is the 
minimum value of Theil’s T. If only one individual has all of the income, this 
represents utmost inequality and is the maximum value of Theil’s T statistic.   
     If members of a population can be classified into mutually exclusive and completely 
exhaustive groups, then Theil’s T statistic is made up of two components, the between 
group element (B) and the within group element (W) (T = B + W), where: 
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where i indexes the groups, pi is the population of group i, P is the total population, yi 
is the average income in group i, and µ is the population-weighted average income 
across the entire population. When aggregated data is available instead of individual 
data, B can be used as a lower bound for the population’s value of Theil’s T statistic.  
     However, B is generically smaller than T, and the portion of B out of T fluctuates; 
on average, the portion is only 12% (Shorrock and Wan (2005)).Therefore, the 
definition of regions needs to be better conceptualized to better capture the current 
status of regional inequality of Korea. Decomposition - regrouping regions - is one 
way of doing so. Shorrock and Wan (2005) said that the method of decomposition 
accounts for regional inequality up to 78% in the case of China. Kanbur and Zhang 
(2003) also used the decomposition and re-grouped China’s provinces into rural and 
urban areas. By doing so, they showed the improved pattern of B between rural and 
urban areas.  Based on these studies, this paper analyzes the regional inequality of 
South Korea using various kinds of decompositions. 
     An interesting property of the Theil Index is that it is relative; Total Theil is a 
between group inequality in terms of individual citizens, but is a total inequality in a 
decomposition, meaning that decomposed inequalities are now between group 
inequality in terms of Total Theil.    
 
Total Theil = W + B (Decomposed Group) 
 
Therefore, the rates of B out of Total Theil indicate what portion of decomposed 
inequality explains total inequality, suggesting an idea of how important these 
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decompositions are. This approach was originally used in Kanbur and Zhang (2005) 
when they decomposed China into coastal and inland, and rural and urban areas. After 
measuring Total Theil of Korea, this paper uses the decomposition methods and 
regroups South Korea (Honam and the rest, Gangwon and the rest, urban and rural) to 
better capture the regional inequality of the country. 
 
3. Overall Regional Inequality of South Korea 
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Figure 3.1. Per Capita GDP and Growth Rate of South Korea 
Source: Penn World Table 6.2. 
 
     Before we move on to South Korea’s regional inequality, let us focus on the growth 
pattern of its per capita GDP. Even though it shows a steadily increasing trend, its rate 
plummeted in 1960, 1979, and 1997 as a result of economic instability, reflecting 
Korea’s modern history. Based on these three periods of instabilities, Korea’s modern 
era since 1945 can be divided into four time periods. 
     The first period, 1945-1961, was when Korea became independent of Japan (1945), 
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South and North Korea established separate governments (1948), and the Korean War 
occurred (1950-53). Having been destroyed by the war, Korea had almost no industry 
and social infrastructure, and the main source for its GDP was from foreign aid.  At the 
end of this first period, president Rhee Syngman was ousted after a corrupt 
presidential election, and the country was thrown into chaos. The second period is 
1961-1979. In 1961, General Park Chunghee staged a military coup and took power as 
the leader of South Korea. President Park maintained strong government power based 
on export-oriented policies. At this time, Korea experienced rapid economic 
development with an average growth rate of 8%. His assassination in 1979 resulted in 
chaos in South Korea, and General Jeon Doohwan replaced him through another coup. 
In the third period (1979-1997), Jeon became a president (1981-1988), followed by 
Roh (1988-1993), and Kim (1993-1998). Korea, during this era, hosted the Olympic 
Games (1988), had a booming economy and stable growth. The fourth phase (1997-
present) began with an unprecedented financial crisis in which Korea’s financial 
system was devastated.  
     This paper focuses on the third and the fourth, because data on regional income in 
provincial level had begun to be collected only in 1985. To analyze regional inequality 
of South Korea, this paper uses these regional per capita GDPs for 15 sub-national 
regions (6 metropolitan city regions and 9 provinces). There are 16 sub-national 
regions in South Korea, seven of which are metropolitan regions, including Ulsan. 
However, this city was not considered in this paper because it became one of the 
metropolitan cities only in 1997. Based on the per capita mean GDP of each region, 
overall regional inequality was measured using Theil’s T (more specifically, the 
equation B in Section 2). Appendix displays data and Figure 3.2 displays each region 
on a map. The result on Theil’s T is displayed in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.2. Map of South Korea 
 
* Metropolitan Cities (1: Seoul   2: Busan   3: Daegu   4: Incheon   5: Gwangju   6: 
Daejeon   7: Ulsan ) 
* Provinces (8: Gyeonggi   9: Gangwon   10: Chungbuk   11: Chungnam   12: Jeonbuk   
13: Jeonnam   14: Gyeongbuk   15: Gyeongnam   16: Jeju) 
 
Note: In the next chapter where decomposition methods are used, Honam and 
Gangwon are paid special attention. In this map, Honam is the region 5, 12, and 13, 
and Gangwon is the region 9. Gangwon is the official province name, but Honam, not 
an official name, includes the provinces of Jeonbuk (12), Jeonnam (13), and Gwangju 
Metropolitan City (5), just like New England in the United States includes the state of 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
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Figure 3.3. Theil’s T of South Korea 
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The indices themselves do not mean anything generically. However, by comparing 
different indices over time, we can examine the trend of growing or declining regional 
inequality. This figure reveals that regional inequality of South Korea has increased 
over the past two decades. More specifically, it shows three patterns: a stable rate until 
1995, a sudden fluctuation for the next couple of years, and a gradual increase since 
then.  The increase in 1997 seems to be associated with the unprecedented financial 
crisis in the country. Decomposition methods in the following chapter will be used for 
better explanation for this pattern. 
 
4. Decomposition 
 
     The following decomposition methods will be used; each has its own political or 
economic explanation. 
 
4.1. Honam and Others 
 
     It is commonly believed that there has been discrimination against the Honam 
region, the southwestern part of Korea (5, 12, 13 from Figure 3.2). Considering 
Korea’s modern political history, this belief is not groundless. Korea’s politics can be 
summarized as the conflict between the Yeongnam-based ruling party and the Honam-
based opposition party. As shown in Table 3.1, ever since Park Chunghee took power 
by a military coup in 1961, South Korean presidents were all from the Yeongnam 
region, the southeastearn part of the Korean peninsula (2, 3, 7, 14, 15 from Figure 3.2) 
until Kim Daejung, originally from Honam, became the president in 1998.  
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Table 3.1. South Korea’s Presidents and Their Hometown 
 
Name31 Presidency  Hometown 
Rhee, Syngman 1948 – 1960  Hwanghaedo (now North Korea) 
Yoon, Boseon 1960 – 1962 Asan, Chungnam 
Park, Chunghee 1962 – 1979 Seonsan, Gyeongbuk, Yeongnam 
Jeon, Duhwan 1980 – 1988 Hapcheon, Gyeongbuk, Yeongnam 
Roh, Taewoo 1988 – 1993  Daegu, Yeongnam 
Kim, Youngsam 1993 – 1998  Geoje, Gyeongnam, Yeongnam 
Kim, Daejung 1998 – 2003 Shinan, Jeonnam, Honam 
Roh, Moohyun 2003 – 2008 Gimhae, Gyeongnam, Yeongnam 
Lee, Myungbak 2008 – Present Pohang, Gyeongbuk, Yeongnam 
      
     Park’s economic development plan focused on the development of the Capital Area 
and Yeongnam, and the connection between the two. The Capital Area was the first 
target because it already had an accessible social infrastructure required for developing 
industries. Additionally, many cities in Yeongnam, including Gumi, Ulsan, Pohang, 
Changwon, and Masan were industrialized by a variety of heavy industries 
(electronics in Gumi, shipping in Ulsan, steel in Pohang, etc). The Capital Area and 
Yeongnam were more closely interconnected when Gyeongbu Expressway, the first 
highway in South Korea, was opened in 1970. In this process of economic 
development, however, there was less investment in the Honam area.  
     Honam’s falling behind is somewhat political. Kim Daejung, a well-known 
congressman from Honam, ran in the presidential election. Even though he was 
defeated by Park Jeonghee, Kim won almost as many votes as Park did. Alarmed by 
this, Park demolished the election system and declared himself to be a permanent 
president of Korea. At the same time, Kim was kidnapped, imprisoned, and even 
threatened to be killed, and Honam was isolated. For example, the portion of high-
ranking public officials from Honam working in the national government in the 1970s 
                                            
31 Following the custom in Korea, Last name comes first.  
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was only 13%, even though population in this region is approximately 30% (Jeon 
1990).  
     Discrimination against Honam became more serious in the 1980s. As soon as Jeon 
Doohwan took power by another military coup, there were nation-wide protests 
against his coup. In the midst of these protests, police shot protesters in Gwangju, the 
capital city in Honam, and officially, 224 people were killed (unofficially, more than 
400). Since then, Gwangju and Honam had been isolated throughout Jeon’s presidency 
(1981-1988). The portion of high ranking public officials in the national government 
originally from Honam dropped to 9.6% and the portion of CEOs in the government-
funded companies who were originally from Honam was only 0.9% (Jeon 1990).   
     Things were improved when Kim Youngsam, the first non-military person since 
Park Jeonghee, was elected as the president of Korea in 1993, followed by Kim 
Daejung in 1998, the first president in South Korea, originally from Honam. It is 
commonly believed that the discrimination against Honam disappeared in the 1990s, 
especially since 1998.  
     How did this history affect the regional inequality of Honam and other regions? A 
completely satisfactory answer is not possible because, before 1989, there was a lack 
of data; the data on regional inequality was first released in 1985 and, in 1989, 
Gwangju was separated from Jeonnam Province to be considered an independent 
metropolitan unit. Working from available data, this section analyzes the inequality 
between Honam and other regions of Korea since 1989. Given the aforementioned 
history, the following hypothesis can be constructed. 
 
Hypothesis 1: As discrimination against Honam has been eased, the regional 
inequality between Honam and non-Honam has declined. 
 
Instead of formal “proof” of this hypothesis, this paper provides “smoking-gun 
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evidence”. In order to investigate this hypothesis, this paper decomposes Korea into 
two parts: Honam and the rest of Korea, and measures the Theil Index between these 
two regions. The result is provided in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4. Theil’s T for Decomposition Between Honam and Other Region & 
ThePortion of This Theil out of Total Theil of Korea 
 
The left figure indicates the Theil Index for the decomposed group between Honam 
and the rest of South Korea, and the right figure displays the portion of this Theil 
Index out of the Total Theil of South Korea shown in Figure 3.4. 
     As this hypothesis predicts, the inequality between Honam and the rest of Korea 
has been decreasing overall. The portion dropped significantly from 24.3% in 1989 to 
1.5% in 1998, suggesting that the per capita mean incomes in those two regions had 
dramatically been converging.  
     Two possible effects can explain this dramatic convergence: first, increasing total 
GDP and second, decreasing population in the Honam area. Since per capita GDP is 
total GDP divided by its population, these effects, combined together, may have 
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resulted in the soaring per capita income level of the Honam region, narrowing the gap 
between Honam and the rest parts of Korea. 
     First, Honam’s total GDP, especially the output level in manufacturing sectors, has 
increased for the past years. It is true that there have been many Honam-friendly 
policies in the 1990s. For example, as shown in Table 3.2, almost all of national 
industrial complexes in Honam were opened in the 1990s and the 2000s, and the 
number of companies, the number of workers, and the volume of exports were all 
growing. In particular, exports more than doubled between 2001 and 2005.  
 
Table 3.2. Industrial Complexes in Honam Area 
 
Name Location Opened Name Location Opened 
Iksan  Honam 1974 Gwangyang Honam 1992 
Gunsan Honam 1994 Daebul Honam 1997 
Gwangju Yeongnam 2001 Yeosu Honam 2002 
Samil Yeongnam 2005 Gunjang Honam 2006 
  
 # Complexes # Companies # Employee Export ($Mil) 
2001 35 2437 99374 12808 
2002 35 2584 101999 13390 
2003 35 2711 107203 21779 
2004 34 2825 112745 22829 
2005 35 3146 119407 28118 
 
Source: Korea Industrial Complex Corporation 
Note: The first table explains only national complexes and the second table includes 
both national and local complexes. 
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Figure 3.5. Manufacturing Sectors in Honam Relative to the Whole Region 
 
As a result, the number of employees and the output level in the Honam region have 
been steadily increasing. In particular, the percentage of output level in the Honam 
area increased from 8% in 1987 to 12.5% in 2004. Additionally, the West Coast 
Highway, finally opened in 2001, connects major cities and industrial complexes in 
Honam area as far as Seoul. Increasing volume of trade between Korea and China also 
benefited Honam’s growth. In 2008, trade volume between Korea and China was more 
than $100 billion, and Korea is China’s 4th largest trading partner, followed by EU, US, 
and Japan. This fact is particularly favorable to Honam’s growth because of its 
geographical proximity to China, being located in the West Coast of Korea. 
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     Figure 3.6. Population Growth Rate 
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     Secondly, the decreasing population of Honam magnified the effect of increasing 
per capita GDP of Honam, thus contributing to the convergence between Honam and 
non-Honam. As shown in Figure 3.6, Honam’s population growth rate has always 
been lower than other regions, and it even recorded negative rates for many years.  
     Overall, Honam has made some industrial progress recently; an increasing number 
of industrial complexes were constructed and the number of companies, the number of 
workers, and the export levels all have grown, which contributed to increasing output 
level. Per capital output level has even soared because population of the region has 
declined. Increasing output level in manufacturing sectors in spite of decreasing 
population indicates the fact that Honam’s manufacturing sectors become more and 
more capital intensive, requiring more output per labor or less labor per output. It can 
be concluded from the decreasing Theil Index that regional inequality between Honam 
and non-Honam has decreased, but it cannot be concluded that this decreasing 
inequality is solely due to the industrial development and increasing total output level 
in the region. 
 
4.2. Gangwon and Others 
 
     Like Honam, Gangwon is another region that has been isolated in the process of 
economic development of South Korea. In some sense, this region may be more 
discriminated against than Honam. The discrimination problem in Honam has been at 
least a “well known” issue among Koreans, and there have been some attempts to 
solve this problem. However, very little attention has been paid to Gangwon with 
respect to its lagging economic growth. As shown in Figure 3.7, Gangwon Province is 
located in the northeast mountainous part of South Korea. Due to its geographical 
constraints, this province has lacked growth both in industry and agriculture. As such, 
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there are no major cities in the province, and transportation networks have not been 
developed in this region. For example, thin lines in Figure 3.7 are highways. 
Gangwon has Yeongdong Highway (horizontal one) and Joongang Highway (vertical 
one). However, as shown in Table 3.3, compared with other highways, Yeongdong 
and Joongang Highways were not constructed until a few years ago, making 
Gangwon lag behind.  
     The same story can be applied to the Korea Train Express (KTX), which is drawn 
as thick lines in Figure 3.7. The KTX, Korea’s first high speed train system with 
maximum speed of 200 miles per hour, opened on April 01, 2004.  It takes only two 
hours to get from Seoul to Busan, and South Korea is now more closely 
interconnected because of this bullet train system.  According to the Korean Railroad 
(KORAIL) (2008), regions where the KTX stops show rapid economic development, 
such as the $100 billion investment in Iksan Industrial Zone with 1,800 new 
employees from 22 different companies, and the $20 trillion investment in Cheonan-
Asan Industrial Zone with 100,000 employees from Samsung Electronics. However, 
as shown in the map below, the KTX does not stop in a single part of Gangwon.    
Table 3.3. Highways in Korea 
 
Name Connecting Opened Note 
Gyeongbu Seoul – Busan  1970 Connects the Capital Area and Yeongnam 
The first highway in Korea 
Honam Seoul – Gwangju 1973 Connects the Capital Area and Honam 
Olympic Daegu– 
Gwangju 
1984 Connects Yeongnam and Honam 
Jungbu Seoul – Daejeon  1987 Aimed at solving congestion problems in 
Capital Area 
Yeongdong Seoul – 
Gangneung  
1995 First opened in 1975, but only 2 way lanes. 
Expanded into 4 way lanes in 1995 
Joongang Chuncheon – 
Daegu  
2001 Connects Gangwon and Yeongnam 
 
Source: Korea Expressway Corporation 
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Note: There are 28 highways in Korea, as of 2008. Only some of them are introduced 
here.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.7.  Highway and KTX Map of Korea (Gangwon area: Inside the Circle) 
 
Based on the narrative above, the following hypothesis can be constructed.  
 
Hypothesis 2: With less accessibility, industrial development in Gangwon Province is 
behind, and therefore, regional inequality between Gangwon and the rest of South 
Korea remains high for the past two decades. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, this paper decomposes Korea into two parts: Gangwon 
and the rest, and measures the Theil Index between these two regions. The result is 
provided in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8. Theil’s T for Decomposition Between Gangwon and Other Region & 
The Portion of This Theil out of Total Theil of Korea 
 
This figure verifies that, unlike the Honam decomposition, there is a high level of 
income disparity between Gangwon and other provinces. Except for 1997-8 period 
where the capital area had a direct shock from the financial crisis, the portion of the 
Theil between Gangwon and the rest out of the total Theil has been over 20%. Given 
that the decomposition of Honam and non-Honam shows a converging pattern, it seem 
that the income disparity between Gangwon and non-Gangwon is one of the main 
reasons for increasing Total Theil of South Korea displayed in Figure 3.3.  
     The following figure confirms this disparity. The portion of Gangwon’s GDP out of 
the entire country has decreased from 3.6% in 1989 to 2.7% in 2006, a much smaller 
portion than in Honam’s case. Moreover, like Honam, the region shows a decreasing 
population for many years.     
     In some sense, the degree of “behind” is bigger in Gangwon than in Honam. The 
fact that it does not have a major industry makes future prospects even worse. In order 
to boost its economy and catch up with other provinces, it tried to host the Winter 
Olympics twice in Pyeongchang, the biggest ski area not only in Gangwon but also in 
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Korea. However, it was defeated by Vancouver, Canada in 2003, and Sochi, Russia, 
2007. Since this province has a comparative advantage in tourism industry (mountains, 
hot springs, skiing, beaches, etc), the national government needs to support the local 
government to develop this industry in order to achieve a balanced economic growth 
over the entire country. 
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Figure 3.9. Relative GDP and Population (Gangwon & Other Area) 
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4.3.Urban and Rural      
     As Korea industrialized, it also became rapidly urbanized. According to Table 3.4, 
the urbanization rate in South Korea doubled from 40.7% in 1970 to 80.8% in 2005, 
higher than any of its neighboring countries. 
Table 3.4. Urbanization Rate (Measured by Proportion of Urban Population) 
 
 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 
S.Korea 40.7 56.7 73.8 78.2 79.6 80.8 
N.Korea 54.2 56.9 58.4 59.1 60.2 61.6 
China 17.4 19.6 27.4 31.4 35.8 40.4 
Japan 53.2 59.6 63.1 64.6 65.2 65.8 
 
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). National Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Korea 
 
     There have  been numerous of studies addressing urban-rural issues. One of the 
most famous ones is the Harris-Todaro Model (1970), which focuses on migration 
between rural and urban areas depending on workers’ expected incomes. Regarding 
income disparity between urban and rural areas, Kanbur and Zhang (2005) found that 
the urban-rural gap is increasing by showing that its portion out of total inequality has 
increased from 6.9% in 1952 to 13.9% in 2000.         
     In the same direction as Kanbur and Zhang, this paper examines the pattern of 
urban-rural income disparity using South Korean data. However, data problems arise 
here; in Korea, “urban area” is defined as a place with population of more than 
100,000 (called si), and “rural area”, as a population less than 100,000 (called gun). 
However, only four provinces (Gangwon, Gyeonggi, Gyeongbuk, and Gyeongnam) 
released income32
                                            
32 All other descriptive statistics (population, gender, education, etc) are available. Only income variable 
was added recently. 
 data on their sis and guns between 2000 and 2004. In this paper, 
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urban and rural areas in these four provinces were decomposed in this way. For the 
remaining regions, however, this paper assumes that a metropolitan city region within 
a province is urban, and the surrounding province is rural. This is a reasonable 
assumption given that metropolitan cities all have populations of at least one million 
and the surrounding provinces (Chungbuk, Chungnam, Jeonbuk, Jeonnam, and Jeju) 
have relatively sparse population. The following table shows which are rural and 
which are urban areas.  
 
Table 3.5. Urban and Rural Classification of South Korea 
 
Urban Rural 
<Metropolitan Cities> 
Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, 
Daejon 
 
< Sis in Gyeonggi Province> 
Suwon, Seongnam, Bucheon, Anyang, 
Ansan, Yongin, Pyeongtaek, 
Gwangmyung, Siheung, Gunpo, 
Hwaseong, Icheon, Gimpo, Gwangju, 
Anseong, Hanam, Uiwang, Osan, 
Gwacheon, Goyang, Uijeongbu, 
Namyangju, Paju, Guri, Dongducheon 
 
<Sis in Gangwon Province> 
Chuncheon, Wonju, Gangneung, 
Donghae, Taebaek, Samcheok 
 
<Sis in Gyeongbuk Province> 
Pohang, Gyeongju, Gimcheon, Andong, 
Gumi, Yeongcheon, Yeongju, Sangju, 
Mungyeong, Gyeongsan 
 
<Sis in Gyeongnam Province> 
Changwon, Masan, Jinju, Jinhae, 
Tongyeong, Sacheon, Gimhae, Miryang, 
Geoje, Yangsan 
<Unclassified Provinces> 
Chungbuk, Chungnam, Jeonbuk, 
Jeonnam 
 
<Guns in Gyeonggi Province> 
Yeoju, Yangpyeong, Pocheon, Yangju, 
Gapyeong, Yeoncheon 
 
<Guns in Gangwon Province> 
Hongcheon, Hoengseong, Yeongwol, 
Pyeongchang, Jeongseon, Cheolwon, 
Hwacheon, Yanggu, Inje, Goseong, 
Yangyang 
 
<Guns in Gyeongbuk Province> 
Gunwi, Eiseong, Cheongsong, 
Yeongyang, Yeongdo, Cheongdo, 
Goryeong, Seongju, Chilgok, 
Yecheon, Bonghwa, Uljin, Ulleung 
 
<Guns in Gyeongnam Province> 
Uiryeong, Haman, Changnyeong, 
Goseong, Namhae, Hadong, 
Sancheong, Hamyang, Geochang, 
Hapcheon 
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Given these data constraints, this paper measures the Theil Index between urban and 
rural areas. The result is provided in Figure 3.10. Because only five years of data are 
available, it may be premature to draw a conclusion, but these graphs definitely reveal 
an increasing inequality between urban and rural areas. The percentage itself may not 
be very big, but it has increased more than six times from 0.5% in 2000 to 3.2% in 
2004.   
     These years (2000-2004) are mainly the period of President Roh Moohyun’s 
regime. One of his policy priorities was Balanced Regional Growth. He even 
announced a decentralization plan of constructing a so-called administrative capital 
somewhere in Chungcheong, one of the rural areas, and moving a large segment of 
government ministries and their associated facilities to this area.  However, much of 
his plan was diminished by strong objections, and the result in Figure 3.10 shows that 
his policies did not work. The next chapters on econometrics will examine what 
caused this growing inequality between the two groups. 
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Figure 3.10. Theil’s T for Decomposition Between Urban and Rural Area & The 
Portion of This Theil out of Total Theil of Korea 
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5. Econometric analyses  
 
     Econometric analyses are conducted in this part to figure out how Korea’s regional 
inequality is affected. The three most important variables affecting regional inequality 
in this paper are, the level of openness, physical capital, and human capital. Openness 
was measured by the share of export out of GDP33
     As a dependent variable, not only the Total Theil, but also decomposed ones, 
including Honam & Non-Honam Theil, Gangwon & Non-Gangwon Theil, and Urban 
& Rural Theil will also be used. Except for the Total Theil, decomposed ones were 
measured by their fractions out of the total one instead of by their actual values. All 
variables are in logarithms, and one-period lagged values of the independent variables 
are used to minimize potential endogeneity problems. Once these first round of 
analyses are conducted, two interaction terms will be added to investigate interacted 
mechanisms through which openness affects regional inequality. The regression 
equation is as follows: 
. There are many different 
measurements for physical capital, and this paper focuses on the infrastructure, and 
measures the highway density (the length of highway divided by the land area). 
Regarding human capital, this paper uses the rate of the number of university students 
(undergraduate and graduate) out of the total number of students (elementary, junior 
high, high, and university). Among these three explanatory variables, openness is the 
most important one affecting regional inequality, as Korea’s economic development 
has been based on export-oriented open trade policies. 
 
 ln (inequality) = a1 + a2  ln (openness) + a3  ln (infrastructure) + a4  ln (education) 
+ a5  ln (openness) * ln (infrastructure) + a6  ln (openness) * ln (education) 
                                            
33 Instead of using the ratio of the sum of export and import to the GDP ((EX+IM)/Y), a popular way of 
measuring openness, this paper uses the share of export out of the GDP (EX/Y) in order to be consistent 
with the national income accounting (Y=C+I+G+EX-IM). 
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More specifically, the first interaction term will test how openness affects inequality 
jointly with the level of infrastructure: does openness affect regions with higher level 
of infrastructure, which is normally high income regions, such that regional income 
disparity will increase? The second term will test how openness affects inequality 
jointly with the level of education; does openness affect regions with higher education 
level, which is normally high income regions, again, such that regional inequality will 
go up? etc. 
     Thirdly, a panel regression analysis is conducted to check whether the results in the 
time series and panel regression are consistent. Here, the following equation is used: 
 
ln (yjt) – ln (yjt-1) = a1 + a2  ln (opennesst-1) + a3  ln(infrastructurejt-1)+  
a4  ln (educationjt-1) + a5 ln (opennesst-1) * ln (infrastructurejt-1) +  
a6  ln (opennesst-1) * ln (education jt-1) 
 
where j stands for each province, and t stands for time. The dependent variable is the 
percent change of mean income difference of region j between year t and t-1, which is 
actually the growth rate. This is not directly related with regional inequality, but it still 
indirectly captures the idea of regional inequality when it is used with interaction 
terms. That means the following: Suppose a5 is positive. Since infrastructure is often 
developed in rich areas, it will be interpreted from this result that increasing trade 
openness is associated with increasing growth rates in high-income regions. This 
approach was used by Rivas (2007) when she researched Mexico’s regional inequality. 
In this sense, the growth rate of a region can be used as a proxy for regional inequality, 
and this panel regression will verify whether the result of time series regression is 
consistent. Finally, The Chow Test is conducted to see whether there is a structural 
break before and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. However, the p-values are all 
over 10%, suggesting that it is not necessary to break the periods into two. Moreover, 
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if the time periods are broken into the two, the number of observations in each period 
are two few, so this paper does not consider the structural break issue for any of the 
following regressions. The Breusch-Pagan Test and Durbin-Watson Test find that 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems are not very significant, but White 
heteroskedasticity consistent estimation will be provided anyway for robustness reason. 
 
5.1. Results 
 
Table 3.6. Time Series Regression with No Interaction Terms 
 
 Total_T Honam_T Gangwon_T RU_T 
Openness -0.388** 
(0.157) 
-2.836*** 
(0.898) 
-1.237* 
(0.657) 
4.126 
(2.237) 
Physical K 0.931*** 
(0.214) 
3.346*** 
(0.963) 
1.534** 
(0.699) 
-0.650 
(4.654) 
Human K -0.526*** 
(0.173) 
-6.674*** 
(1.087) 
-1.444 
(0.912) 
18.139 
(15.582) 
Adj R2 0.567 0.852 0.190 0.788 
Chow-test   
p-value 
0.166 0.158 0.1327 - 
Breush Pagan 
p-value 
0.020 0.197 0.464 0.690 
Durbin-
Watson value 
1.510 0.962 0.823 3.334 
 
Notes: All the variables are in logarithmic form and independent variables have one-
year lag. The Bruesh Pagan Test reveals that this regression is generally 
homoskedastic except for Total_T where p-value is 0.02. However, for robustness, this 
paper uses White  heteroskedasticity consistent estimation, whose robust standard 
errors are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The Durbin Watson Test reveals that autocorrelation 
is not a serious problem; except for rural_urban case, the values are inside the so-
called indecisive zone where we cannot conclude there is an autocorrelation problem. 
The rural_urban case has negative autocorrelation, but since the observation is very 
few (five), this problem is trivial. The null hypothesis of the Chow Test is that there is 
no structural break in 1997 (financial crisis), which is not rejected. The Chow Test 
results are all insignificant, so they will not be provided in the upcoming regressions. 
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The beginning year of rural-urban decomposition is 2000, which makes this test 
impossible. Dependent variables for Honam_T, Gangwon_T, and RU_T are their 
portion relative to Total_T, which were discussed in Chapter 4. Openness was 
measured using export ratio out of total trade volume. Physical capital was measured 
using highway density. Human capital was measured using the rate of university 
students out of total number of students.  
 
Table 3.7. Time Series Regression with Interaction Terms 
 
 Total_T Honam_T Gangwon_T RU_T34
Openness 
 
7.958** 
(3.532) 
43.943*** 
(10.900) 
41.774*** 
(8.826) 
- 
Physical K 3.300*** 
(0.934) 
-15.654*** 
(2.900) 
12.911*** 
(2.305) 
- 
Human K -4.524 
(0.346) 
-10.023*** 
(1.060) 
-4.287*** 
(0.607) 
- 
Openness*PhysicalK 2.060** 
(0.766) 
9.800*** 
(2.516) 
9.118*** 
(2.058) 
- 
Openness*HumanK 0.063 
(0.160) 
2.400*** 
(0.594) 
2.077*** 
(0.363) 
- 
Adj R2 0.685 0.906 0.595 - 
Breush Pagan p-value 0.731 0.222 0.995  
Durbin-Watson value 2.160 2.040 1.701  
 
Notes: All the variables are in logarithmic form and independent variables have one-
year lag. The Bruesh Pagan Test reveals that this regression does not have a 
heteroskedasticity problems. However, for robustness, this paper uses White 
heteroskedasticity consistent estimation, whose robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. The Durbin-Waton Test reveals that autocorrelation is not a serious 
problem; Total_T and Honam_T are within ‘not-rejecting’ zone, and Gangwon_T is 
within ‘indecisive’ zone. There are no available data for physical capital and human 
capital in urban-rural level. Dependent variables for Honam_T, Gangwon_T, and 
RU_T are their portion relative to Total_T.  
 
     Two results are provided. In Table 3.6, interaction terms are not included. That said, 
there are three explanatory variables (openness, physical capital, and human capital). 
In Table 3.7, two interaction terms (openness*physical capital & openness*human 
                                            
34 Data on physical capital and human capital are not known in rural-urban level. 
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capital) are included to capture the direct and indirect impact of trade openness on 
regional inequality. 
     An interesting observation can be made when we compare the signs of openness in 
both tables. The sign is negative35
     This result is related with asymmetric gains from trade. The WTO claims that 
benefits from trade tend to be biased toward a region with higher levels of physical 
and/or human capital. For example, it is known that there exists so-called the “learning 
by exporting” effect in a firm when they experience a variety of knowledge spillovers 
in the process of trade (World Trade Report (WTR) 2008), and a region with high 
quality of human capital has an advantage of absorbing these spillovers more 
efficiently, and may grow faster than other regions. For another example, the size of 
trade cost, one of the major determinants of gains from trade, is huge in an area with 
poor public transportation networks, meaning that an area with advanced physical 
capital tends to benefit more from trade.  
 in Table 3.6, but positive in Table 3.7. It is revealed 
that trade openness contributes to reducing regional inequality when measured on its 
own, but increasing inequality when interaction terms are considered. The interaction 
terms themselves also have positive coefficients. This is consistent with Kanbur and 
Zhang (2005)’s result, one of whose findings is that “greater openness is associated 
with greater regional inequality in a spatially large country such as China.” Although 
Korea is a spatially small country, the relationship between trade and regional 
inequality is positive both in China and Korea. 
     Broadly speaking, this is consistent with the idea of coordinated investment or 
balanced growth, argued by Rosenstein-Rodan as old as in 1943 and Nurkse in 1953, 
formalized by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny in 1989, who argued that coordination 
                                            
35 Urban-rural Theil has positive sign, meaning that trade openness leads to increasing urban-rural gap. 
However, the observations are only five and the results are not significant, so it may be premature to 
draw a conclusion.    
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failure and no emergence of high tech industries in an economy would result in a low 
production trap, which eventually creates poverty trap. Their idea was further 
developed by Kremer (1993), whose famous “O-ring Theory” describes not only a low 
quantity trap but also a low quality trap that blocks industrialization. Coordinated 
investment on human and physical capital leads to a higher growth rate in a region, 
and this biased growth pattern widens the gap between high and low income areas, 
facilitating regional inequality of a country.    
     The results on the coefficients of physical and human capital (not the interaction 
terms) are a bit complicated; for physical capital, the signs are negative for Honam, 
but positive for the rest, and for human capital, the signs are all negative. Even though 
advanced human capital level facilitates regional inequality when it was interacted 
with trade openness, it itself contributes to reducing regional inequality, which is 
consistent with Rivas (2007).   
     The result in Table 3.7 is re-examined using a panel data with the same explanatory 
variables to compare the result and check the consistency. Here, the dependent 
variable is not the Theil Index itself, but the percent change of mean income difference 
of region j between year t and t-1, which is actually the same as the growth rate. 
Regional inequality will be measured indirectly by this variable. The mean income 
difference in each region can be a proxy for the overall regional inequality, so the 
result can be compared with that of the Total Theil in Table 3.7. Both the result of 
fixed effects and random effects are provided. Each fixed and random effects have 
different groups, regions and time. Therefore, there are four results in Table 3.8: region 
fixed effect, region random effect, time fixed effect, and time random effect.  
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Table 3.8. Panel Regression with Interaction Terms 
 
 Region 
Fixed 
Region 
Random 
Time 
Fixed 
Time 
Random 
Openness 0.144 (0.154) 
0.272* 
(0.151) 
0.484*** 
(0.139) 
0.244** 
(0.115) 
Physical K 0.026 (0.041) 
-0.003 
(0.352) 
-0.001 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.023) 
Human K -0.01287 (0.075) 
0.128* 
(0.069) 
0.069* 
(0.450) 
0.068* 
(0.046) 
Openness* 
Physical K 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.027) 
0.006 
(0.168) 
0.005 
(0.017) 
Openness*
Human K 
0.056 
(0.056) 
0.113** 
(0.054) 
0.053* 
(0.035) 
0.054* 
(0.036) 
Within R2 0.088 0.026 0.106 0.084 
Between R2 0.359 0.396 0.000 0.001 
Overall R2 0.001 0.044 0.002 0.007 
N 255 255 255 255 
 
Notes: The Hausman Test is conducted and the null hypothesis that random effect 
models are consistent is rejected (chi-square value is 25, and its p-value is 0.001), 
meaning that more attention needs to be paid to the fixed effect models. However, the 
both fixed and random effects provide similar results anyway.  
 
     These result on trade openness is consistent with the result in Table 7; openness has 
a positive effect on regional inequality, both directly (the variable by itself) and 
indirectly (the interaction terms). However, the effect of physical and human capital 
on regional inequality is rather opposite; unlike the result in Table 3.7 where the signs 
of physical and human capital are mostly positive and negative, the panel data has the 
opposite signs (negative and positive).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
     For the past four decades, South Korea has experienced a rapid economic growth.  
It was called one of the East Asian Tigers, and the World Bank even called this rapid 
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growth a ‘miracle’.  However, even though the pie is getting larger, it is not 
necessarily equally distributed: a famous statement that the pareto efficiency does not 
guarantee equity can be applied here. National inequality and decomposed inequality 
fluctuate over time.  Overall, regional inequality of Korea has grown over the past two 
decades (Figure 3.3). However, decomposed inequality between Honam and non-
Honam has been reduced (Figure 3.4), but further discussion is made whether this 
declining gap is due to Honam’s industrial development or simply due to its 
decreasing population. Other decomposed inequalities (Gangwon and Non-Gangwon, 
and rural and urban) have been increasing. Empirical findings reveal that trade 
openness, associated with physical and human capital development, is positively 
related with regional inequality, meaning that gains from trade are better acquired in a 
region where physical and human capital are well established. As Basu mentioned 
(2000), a certain “coordination heave” is what is needed to overcome regional income 
gap of a country, and government should focus on reaching this goal in the most “cost-
effective” way. 
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APPENDIX. GROSS REGIONAL DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
($1,000, CONSTANT PRICE AT 2000) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Seoul  Busan Daegu Incheon Gwangju Daejeon Gyeonggi 
1985 52411282 14430746 8779457 9293516 0 0 30010360 
1986 59165592 16408907 10042467 10713344 0 0 35027026 
1987 66206197 18467613 11374999 12064802 5236491 0 40202363 
1988 72609785 20164255 12459309 13447381 6140721 0 45015459 
1989 80269044 21096139 13240095 14836504 6710236 7581802 48227301 
1990 88925802 23235544 14537975 16366412 7840124 8366175 53665445 
1991 96072770 24861477 15368211 18290099 8398815 9465117 61778442 
1992 104103792 25793456 16270405 19214230 9048684 10431265 66299616 
1993 111837810 26716009 17055697 20114032 9670270 11159427 70936605 
1994 120246336 29003285 18582242 21819412 10614885 11373870 77819629 
1995 127110656 32500602 20364899 25247368 11386933 11617775 85755745 
1996 130859446 34107584 21488264 26536853 11995806 12312442 90849435 
1997 133742572 34022863 21598087 27298401 12353686 12890143 94045169 
1998 121450056 29716875 18535147 22201627 10541305 11815295 83965776 
1999 127750331 32100217 19521099 24691429 11575866 12619819 99613365 
2000 138492266 33839838 20776260 26230654 12628813 13559020 111793461 
2001 143087757 36091423 20808913 27427292 13007721 14053464 117654605 
2002 154503088 37884530 21683831 29952167 14171608 14935439 130220977 
2003 154943893 39579757 22120792 30788186 14271550 16026414 133648749 
2004 156224159 39856004 22342909 31866182 14636628 16280876 146743122 
2005 158304122 40815222 23000935 33219335 15431675 16442392 158694332 
2006 163072704 41851087 23413727 34828545 15982772 16880705 171864410 
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APPENDIX (CONTINUED) 
            
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). National Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Korea 
 
Note:  
• South Korea is divided into 16 sub-national region. Seven of them (Seoul, Busan, 
Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, and Ulsan) are metropolitan city regions and 
nine of them (Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungbuk, Chungnam, Jeonbuk, Jeonnam, 
Gyeongbuk, Gyeongnam, and Jeju)  provinces.  
• Ulsan was discarded in this research because it became an independent 
metropolitan city only in 1997. It is too recent to be included in this research. 
• The National Statistical Office have released data on sub-national GDP (Gross 
Regional Domestic Product : GRDP) since 1985.  
• Gwangju belonged to Jeonnam Province until 1986. In 1987, Gwangju became an 
independent metropolitan city, separated from Jeonnam Province.  
• Daejeon belonged to Chungnam Province until 1988. In 1989, Daejon became an 
independent metropolitan city, sepated from Chungnam Province.  
 
 
 
Gangwon Chungbuk Chungnam Jeonbuk Jeonnam Gyeongbuk Gyeongnam Jeju 
8047218 5881700 13862014 8190666 14241606 14484061 18686413 2068101 
8792723 6403147 15808457 9103706 15846473 16387735 21093942 2176784 
9699984 7046177 17106257 9714688 12913825 17939127 23507768 2430928 
9885830 7847314 18930125 10861217 14233135 19460430 26316502 2662081 
10845311 8898964 14393133 11317150 15200104 20917053 27970625 3175381 
11067782 9540047 14900606 11763631 16329010 21728029 30770931 3236570 
11512699 10655039 16222440 12851425 18090748 23633085 34736735 3631305 
12122256 11603126 17802526 13571928 19537049 24856830 36645225 4058974 
12695865 12764652 18860766 14274013 20265889 25362045 37543446 4114416 
13638912 13810284 21171722 15596767 22211193 28242929 42331850 4385759 
14800680 15153938 20941551 16819535 23929502 29586021 45360747 4917682 
15991583 16755178 23981977 18053847 25900492 32063842 50233976 5165769 
16715056 17828224 25870649 19105407 27858137 34022051 53650741 5324953 
14718275 15771218 23504306 16441813 25294352 30853018 32869403 4729745 
15391421 18010060 26834661 18099931 26078586 35124906 35921683 4885301 
16462239 19521392 28962820 18977807 26907552 38445650 37728411 5289484 
16391137 19531164 29787646 19298132 27621781 40976724 41083904 5691656 
17216474 21042697 32430386 19909619 28613479 44073856 43066347 6003038 
18449218 21817690 34877823 20918902 29400644 47305285 45518042 6193804 
18634765 23690112 38074358 22018543 30751105 51353487 47723735 6276810 
18888731 23900139 41403366 22564979 31675777 53902299 48961442 6501185 
19699230 25475947 45268203 23892660 32569597 57049782 50587882 6615857 
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